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INTRODUCTION 
The Bill of Rights, framed in an atmosphere of great mistrust of a 
potentially oppressive government,1 not only enunciates broad prin-
ciples limiting the powers of the federal government, such as due 
process of law,2 but also includes more particularized rules to safe-
guard individual liberty.  The Sixth Amendment, for example, guards 
against unjustified deprivations of life and liberty3 by mandating that 
the federal government provide seven specific procedural protections 
to all those accused of committing a crime.4 
Over the course of the two centuries since its ratification, but par-
ticularly during the last few decades, the scope and meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections have undergone signifi-
cant development.  While the Warren Court era was marked by the 
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment and by largely expansive 
readings of the Sixth Amendment, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts 
adopted decidedly more restrictive readings of the Amendment. 
During the course of this jurisprudential development, the Court 
has adopted a number of constructions of the Sixth Amendment that 
plainly contravene its text and are increasingly less protective of indi-
vidual liberty.  For example, contrary to the textual mandate that de-
fendants in “all” criminal prosecutions be provided the seven proce-
dural protections, the Court has held that the rights to jury trial and 
 
 1 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1140 (1992) 
(describing the fear of Anti-Federalists that the government would be controlled by the 
aristocracy and would rule through corruption and force); Erik G. Luna, The Models of 
Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 398 (1999) (“[A]ll criminal procedure rights 
share a common purpose—limiting the means by which government can investigate, 
prosecute, and punish crime.”); George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide:  
Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 157 
(2001) (“Fear of a powerful central government led the drafters to give the new govern-
ment specific powers, with the idea that all other powers and functions remained with the 
States.”). 
 2 See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 
769 (1991) (“[O]ne need not be a radical deconstructionist to believe that the open-
ended phraseology of many of the Constitution’s most litigated provisions resists deter-
minate interpretation.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of 
Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1556 (2008) (“[I]n drafting the Constitution, the 
Framers were not enacting a series of specific and predetermined rules. . . . [D]ue process 
[was] not designed as [a] crabbed, narrow-minded ordinance[] like [a] speed limit[].  
Rather, [it was] intended to serve as [an] open-ended aspiration[] that would gain mean-
ing and vitality over time.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (“The [jury trial] clause was clearly 
intended to protect the accused from oppression by the Government . . . .” (citation omit-
ted)). 
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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counsel need to be provided only in a limited subset of criminal 
prosecutions, and that too in differing subsets.  Even the Court’s tex-
tually inconsistent expansive readings of the rights to public trial and 
compulsory process, extending the former to pre-trial proceedings 
and including in the latter a right to have witnesses testify, have ironi-
cally opened the door to textually inconsistent restrictive readings of 
the Sixth Amendment. 
The textually inconsistent, restrictive interpretations of the Sixth 
Amendment pose a significant problem irrespective of what theory of 
constitutional interpretation one ascribes to because constitutional 
text is a necessary beginning point.5  While the text, including that of 
the Sixth Amendment, is not always unambiguously clear, where it is, 
that plain meaning constitutes a minimal baseline in protection of 
individual liberty.6  Whatever one might think about the propriety of 
the Court’s finding that the Sixth Amendment provides greater pro-
tections of individual liberty than the text might seem to suggest, it is 
 
 5 This Article does not claim that the Sixth Amendment’s text provides the means to re-
solve all interpretive issues.  Indeed, as scholars have noted “[t]he text did not come with 
a user’s guide or a set of instructions for interpretation.  As noted by Judge Richard Pos-
ner, ‘The Constitution does not say, “Read me broadly,” or, “Read me narrowly.”’”  Luna, 
supra note 1, at 422 (footnote omitted).  In fact, “[s]cholars generally agree that a num-
ber of tools are available to interpret the Constitution, including the text itself, original 
intent, constitutional structure, judicial precedents, and contemporary values.”  Id. at 394.  
This Article, however, does begin with the premise that the text is the proper starting 
point in constitutional interpretation.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of 
Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1998) (stating that “lawyers and judges must of-
ten go beyond the letter of the law, but the text itself is an obvious starting point of legal 
analysis”); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:  Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1995) (calling “for an 
unabashed return to rigor and precision in the interpretive process—for a commitment 
to take text and structure seriously”); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the 
Constitution:  Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 327 (2005) (“Textual-
ists think the constitutional text is the ‘touchstone’ of constitutional meaning . . .” (cita-
tion omitted)); Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking:  Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead Con-
stitution, SLATE, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125226 (arguing that a “living 
Constitution requires that judges faithfully apply the constitutional text, given the mean-
ings the words had when they were first enacted, applying those words to today’s circum-
stances”). 
 6 This primacy of the plain meaning of the text is contingent on its being consistent with 
the history and purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  Where a plain reading of the text 
conflicts with the history or purposes of the Amendment, adopting a purely textual inter-
pretation might be unwise.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE:  FIRST PRINCIPLES 153 (1997) (noting that a purely textual argument some-
times must yield to arguments based on history, structure, precedent, or practicality).  
None of the textual readings of the Sixth Amendment offered in this Article are inconsis-
tent with the purposes or history of the Sixth Amendment. 
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difficult to claim that the Sixth Amendment provides lesser protec-
tions of individual liberty than that evident from a plain reading of 
the text. 
The Court’s problematic textually inconsistent restrictive readings 
of the Sixth Amendment can be traced to the interplay between the 
Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.  In some instances, the Court has entangled the two constitu-
tional provisions in the process of incorporating the Sixth Amend-
ment through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
leading the Court to adopt some textually inconsistent restrictive 
readings arguably in order to mitigate the impact of incorporation on 
the states.  In other instances, the Court has entangled the two consti-
tutional provisions by improperly locating expansive procedural pro-
tections in the rules of the Sixth Amendment as opposed to deriving 
the same rights from the general principle of Due Process, ironically 
opening the door to possible restrictive reading of the Sixth Amend-
ment in the future.  Finally, the Court has entangled the two constitu-
tional provisions by improperly using Due Process interpretative me-
thodologies to give meaning to the Sixth Amendment, leading to 
textually inconsistent restrictive readings. 
In addition to providing a doctrinal framework for the textually 
inconsistent restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment, this Article 
proposes alternate, textually sound constructions in light of the re-
cent noteworthy development in the Court’s criminal procedure ju-
risprudence.7  While commentators have celebrated or decried two 
 
 7 This Article only addresses those instances of entanglement where there is a compelling 
textual alternative.  There remain other entanglements not addressed here.  For exam-
ple, in determining whether the right to counsel applies at pre-trial proceedings, the 
Court has adopted a “critical stages” test.  See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317–21 
(1973); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1970).  Under the “critical stages” test, the 
right to counsel applies to “those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the 
merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel.”  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 122 (1975).  Put somewhat differently, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel ap-
plies at “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s 
absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.”  United States v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).  Under these formulations, the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is limited to stages where the defendant’s defense would be impaired or where 
the fair trial may be derogated.  Impairment and derogation of a fair trial, however, are 
due process concerns.  Similarly, the Court has entangled the Sixth Amendment in the 
context of the right to counsel during interrogations.  The Court has held that the gov-
ernment may not deliberately elicit statements from an indicted defendant in the absence 
of counsel.  Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).  However, the scope of 
this protection has been limited to interrogations pertaining to the same offense.  To de-
fine which offenses are the same, the Court has imported its Fifth Amendment double 
jeopardy jurisprudence.  See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172–73 (2001); McNeil v. Wis-
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landmark opinions—Apprendi v. New Jersey8 and Crawford v. Washing-
ton9—and their progeny as having affected fundamental change in 
the Court’s sentencing and Confrontation Clause jurisprudence re-
spectively, the Article suggests that these seminal decisions are more 
properly understood as being part of a common enterprise—the 
Court’s commitment to disentangle the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and to reclaim the textual core of the Sixth Amend-
ment. 
In Part I, the Article sets forth a historical account of the Court’s 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, highlighting the Court’s recent ex-
pansive and restrictive readings of the various procedural protections 
that have led to the entanglement of the Sixth Amendment.  In Part 
II, the Article discusses the two recent seminal developments in the 
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence that have entailed disen-
tangling the Sixth Amendment from the Due Process Clause.  In Part 
III, this Article identifies the remaining textually inconsistent read-
ings of the Sixth Amendment that can be traced to the Court’s en-
tanglement of the Sixth Amendment and proposes alternate read-
ings, ones that are more faithful to the text of the Sixth Amendment 
and more protective of individual liberty.10 
 
consin, 501 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1991).  The importation of the double jeopardy test set 
forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), however, is an unnecessary 
entanglement of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  A more intellectually appealing 
alternative to the Blockburger rule would be to view a criminal prosecution as including all 
the acts or transactions that are “closely related” to the instant prosecution.  See Cobb, 532 
U.S. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“We can, and should, define ‘offense’ in terms of the 
conduct that constitutes the crime that the offender committed on a particular occasion, 
including criminal acts that are ‘closely related to’ or ‘inextricably intertwined with’ the 
particular crime set forth in the charging instrument.”); see also Melissa Minas, Note, Blur-
ring the Line:  Impact of Offense-Specific Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 195, 218–22 (2002) (arguing that the Court unnecessarily reduced the 
Sixth Amendment protections by replacing the workable “closely related” test with the 
more restrictive Blockburger test). 
 8 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that due process requires that any fact increasing criminal 
penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond 
reasonable doubt). 
 9 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of a 
testimonial hearsay statement unless the witness is unavailable and was previously subject 
to cross-examination). 
 10 While this Article suggests that various rights, such as the right to public pre-trial proceed-
ings, have been improperly located in the Sixth Amendment, it does not advocate that 
these rights lack constitutional bases.  On the contrary, these rights are properly located 
in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See generally Akhil 
Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807 (1997) (arguing that 
some interpretative problems in the Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence can be 
avoided by locating those rights in the Due Process Clause); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on 
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I.  THE PATH TRAVELLED:  A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE COURT’S 
SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Sixth Amendment, proposed by James Madison in 1789 and 
ratified in 1791,11 requires the federal government to provide seven 
specific procedural protections to all those it accuses of committing a 
crime:  the right to a speedy trial; the right to a public trial; the right 
to a trial before an impartial jury drawn in a prescribed manner; the 
right to notice; the right of confrontation; the right to compulsory 
process; and the right to assistance of counsel.12 
Despite the broad reach of these procedural safeguards, there 
were relatively few Supreme Court cases of significance involving the 
Sixth Amendment for over a century after its ratification.13  In fact, 
the only provision of the Sixth Amendment that the Court dealt with 
during this period was the right to a jury trial:  in a series of decisions 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Court circumscribed 
the scope of the right to a jury trial, finding that the right did not ex-
tend to the trial of petty crimes.14 
The dearth of Sixth Amendment cases during this period is not 
surprising.  Since most crimes were prosecuted by states, to whom the 
Bill of Rights did not apply,15 and since there was a significant limita-
 
Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law:  “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. 
L. REV. 1559 (1996) (arguing for a robust reading of the Due Process Clause and advocat-
ing for due process of law as the appropriate means for resolving uncertainty in constitu-
tional criminal procedure). 
 11 Penny J. White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death:  The Right to Confrontation 
at Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 387, 397 n.46 (2007) (describing 
the history of the Sixth Amendment and the development of its language). 
 12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 13 Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 342 (“[T]here was very 
little case law interpreting the Sixth Amendment in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies . . . .”). 
 14 See generally District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 
195 U.S. 65 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 
540 (1888). 
 15 See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that 
the Fifth Amendment only limits the federal government and is not applicable to state 
governments).  There were also significant procedural hurdles preventing state court de-
fendants from using collateral proceedings to appeal to the Supreme Court.  Paul M. Ba-
tor, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
441, 465 (1963) (“[U]ntil 1867 (and with exceptions not relevant here) there was no fed-
eral habeas jurisdiction to inquire into detentions pursuant to state law.  Further, even af-
ter the act of 1867 established such a jurisdiction, the Supreme Court could make no 
pronouncements in cases of state detention because the Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
under the act of 1867 was removed in 1868 and not reestablished until 1885.  Thus dur-
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tion on a defendant’s ability to challenge a federal conviction,16 there 
was little occasion for the Court to interpret the mandates of the 
Sixth Amendment.  This was true even during the Reconstruction Era 
despite the enactment of a statute geared at expanding state defen-
dants’ access to federal courts.17 
While the first few decades of the twentieth century witnessed a 
marked evolution in the Court’s willingness to apply Due Process lim-
its on state criminal procedures and practices,18 this jurisprudential 
change did not involve the Sixth Amendment, whose provisions re-
mained unincorporated.19  There were only two significant develop-
ments, both involving the right to counsel—the Court read the right 
to counsel expansively to include an obligation for the federal gov-
 
ing the first century of the Constitution the Court had no occasion to deal with the scope 
of the habeas jurisdiction for state prisoners.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 16 See Bator, supra note 15, at 473 n.75 (“Until 1889 federal criminal cases were reviewable 
by the Supreme Court only when there was a division of opinion in the circuit court on a 
question of law.”). 
 17 See id. at 478–93 (discussing the early cases involving habeas corpus jurisdiction for state 
prisoners); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2337–38 
(1993) (“[O]ne of the most significant enactments of the Reconstruction era, the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867, extended that jurisdiction to cases in which petitioners charged they 
were unlawfully detained by state officials. . . .  In the wake of Reconstruction, habeas 
helped shape the relations between the federal government and the states.” (footnotes 
omitted)); id. at 2339–40 (“Still, as late as the notorious Leo Frank case, Frank v. Mangum, 
the Court repeated the confused boilerplate that had attached itself to the writ over the 
preceding century. . . . [and] federal habeas was open only if the state court had ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction—if it had ceased to act as a court.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 18 During the early years of the twentieth century, even as the Court was reading the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause broadly to strike down state economic regula-
tions, it did not take the same robust view of the Due Process Clause to intervene in state 
criminal prosecutions.  See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised:  Lochner 
and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (2003) (“If the 
Lochner era unofficially began in 1897 . . . and ended in 1937 . . . , then twenty-six Justices 
served on the Lochner era Court over a period of forty years.  The vast majority of these 
Justices were at least moderate Lochnerians in the sense that they believed the Court 
should engage in meaningful review of regulatory legislation that interfered with the lib-
erty of contract to ensure that such legislation was constitutionally valid as an exercise of 
the states’ police powers.”).  This changed over time, perhaps due to the shocking legacy 
of thousands of lynchings and mob trials, and the Court issued a series of decisions over-
turning state convictions.  See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confes-
sions); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (discrimination in juries); Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (perjury); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (counsel 
in capital cases); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (financially-biased judge); Moore v. 
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trials); see also Klarman, supra note 2, at 
764 (“The vast majority of the Court’s first constitutional interventions in state criminal 
procedure involved the Jim Crow ‘justice’ southern states meted out to black defen-
dants.”); Yackle, supra note 17, at 2341 (“The meaning of due process developed rapidly 
between the two world wars.”). 
 19 See Yackle, supra note 17, at 2341. 
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ernment to appoint counsel for indigent defendants20 and to include 
the requirement that the assistance provided by counsel be effective.21 
It was not until the Warren Court era that the Court’s Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence witnessed significant development.22  Per-
haps most importantly, over the course of several years, the Court in-
corporated the various provisions of the Sixth Amendment,23 finding 
for the most part that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause guaranteed defendants in state courts the same fundamental 
procedural protections guaranteed by the Framers to defendants in 
federal courts.24  Ironically, this process of incorporation, properly 
 
 20 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding that indigent criminal defendants in 
federal court are entitled by the Sixth Amendment to court-appointed counsel). 
 21 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1942) (holding that “the ‘assistance of coun-
sel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untram-
meled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously 
represent conflicting interests”).  This reading of the Sixth Amendment was reiterated by 
the Court in subsequent cases.  See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (re-
asserting that “defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of 
competent counsel”). 
 22 The Warren Court’s “criminal procedure revolution” can be seen as a reaction both to 
“pervasive legislative abdication of criminal procedure rulemaking”—for example, for 
more than two decades Congress failed to take any action to implement the Court’s deci-
sion requiring the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants—and to “disparate 
class and racial impact” of criminal prosecutions.  Klarman, supra note 2, at 764–67. 
 23 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 
(1967) (compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy 
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel).  While the Court’s earlier opinions in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 
(1948), and Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948), do not make this clear, in later years 
the Court has seen them as having incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s rights to public 
trial and notice, respectively.  See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 n.7 (1975) (cit-
ing the two cases as having incorporated the respective Sixth Amendment rights); see also 
Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 647 
(1999) (“The Warren Court cases indeed worked a revolution in the administration of 
justice in the states.  The revolution, however, took the doctrinal form of incorporating 
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 24 There have been only two exceptions to this “jot-for-jot” approach to incorporation.  First, 
despite the long-standing understanding that the right to a jury trial meant the right to a 
unanimous jury verdict, Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) (“Unanimity in 
jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.”), the Court 
has held that this unanimity requirement is not applicable to state prosecutions, Apodaca 
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).  Similarly, the Court held that while a twelve-person jury 
was required in federal prosecutions, juries in state prosecutions could be composed of 
fewer than twelve persons.  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).  In a series of subse-
quent decisions, the Court set forth the due process limitations on jury size and anonym-
ity in state prosecutions.  In particular, the Court subsequently held that juries in state 
courts must be comprised of a minimum of six persons, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 
(1978), and that non-unanimous verdicts in state prosecutions would be unconstitutional 
if they were the product of six-person juries, Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).  
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seen as an expansive reading of the Due Process Clause as opposed to 
an expansive reading of the Sixth Amendment, provided the impetus 
for later restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment.25 
The Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence was also signifi-
cantly affected by the Warren Court’s removal of the jurisprudential 
handcuffs that had been imposed on the federal courts’ ability to re-
medy constitutional violations through the great writ of habeas cor-
pus.26  The Court’s subsequent decision to subject constitutional vio-
lations—not violations of mere ordinances or rules or statutes, but 
violations of the Constitution—to harmless error analysis27 too had an 
important effect on the Sixth Amendment.28 
In addition to these procedural developments affecting the Sixth 
Amendment, the Warren Court era was marked by expansive substan-
tive readings of the Sixth Amendment.  For instance, the Court read 
the Confrontation Clause to prohibit the use, in a joint trial, of a non-
testifying co-defendant’s confession notwithstanding the trial court’s 
cautionary instructions that the confession was being admitted 
against the co-defendant only.29  It also read the right to counsel ex-
pansively, extending its scope to pre-trial proceedings such as ar-
raignments,30 some post-arrest31 and post-indictment interrogations,32 
 
Therefore, while both 9-3 and 5-1 jury verdicts are unconstitutional in federal prosecu-
tions, only the latter are unconstitutional in state prosecutions. 
 25 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the Court’s opinion “dilute[d] a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of 
‘incorporation,’ the ‘jot-for-jot and case-for-case’ application of the federal right to the 
States, with the reality of federalism”). 
 26 See Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint:  Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1057, 1066 (2002) (describing the Warren Court’s efforts to improve oversight of state 
courts by expanding state prisoners’ rights to challenge their convictions in federal 
court). 
 27 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (allowing courts to deny relief even if a defen-
dant demonstrates a constitutional violation if the government proves, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that the violation did not affect the jury’s verdict). 
 28 While the development of harmless error analysis might be viewed as a restrictive devel-
opment from an ex post perspective insofar as it limits the universe of defendants who 
would be entitled to relief upon a showing of a constitutional violation, from an ex ante 
perspective it is arguably an expansive development.  This is because it makes more likely 
that courts will deem offending state practices to be unconstitutional—a court after all 
could find that a violation occurred, but need not worry that resources would be need-
lessly expended by mandating a retrial of a clearly guilty defendant—which in turn en-
hances the prescriptive value of the constitutional rule, making future compliance with 
that rule more likely. 
 29 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
 30 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1961). 
 31 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
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and post-indictment lineups,33 finding that it applied irrespective of a 
defendant’s request for counsel,34 and creating a per se exclusionary 
rule prohibiting the use of testimony of some uncounseled identifica-
tions.35  Finally, the Court read expansively the right to compulsory 
process and struck down a statute that created a per se rule against 
the admissibility of testimony by persons who had participated in the 
crime with the defendant.36 
This is not to say that the Warren Court read all Sixth Amend-
ment provisions broadly.  For example, notwithstanding the Sixth 
Amendment’s text that provides that the right to a jury trial is to be 
provided “In all criminal prosecutions,” when the Court incorporated 
the right to jury trial, it cited prior precedent to hold that the right 
applies only to trials of non-petty crimes.37  While the Court subse-
quently read the right to jury trial to include criminal contempt pro-
ceedings, it excluded “petty” contempt proceedings.38  Nevertheless, 
overall, the Warren Court is properly seen as having taken an expan-
sive approach to the Sixth Amendment.39 
 
 32 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  But see Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168 
(2001) (“[A] defendant’s statements regarding offenses for which he had not been 
charged  [are]  admissible  notwithstanding  the  attachment of  his  Sixth  Amendment  
right  to  counsel  on  other charged offenses.”); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 
(1986) (“[Although] the government may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements 
from an accused out of the presence of counsel . . . [,] evidence concerning the crime for 
which the defendant had not been indicted . . . would be admissible at a trial limited to 
those charges.” (citation omitted)); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1985) 
(“Incriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment 
right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those offenses.”). 
 33 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967). 
 34 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962). 
 35 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273–74 (1967). 
 36 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
 37 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).  The Burger and Rehnquist Courts reaffirmed 
this reading of the right to jury trial.  See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 
(1989) (holding that any offense, even one deemed “serious” like a DUI, is still “petty” if 
the authorized maximum sentence is six months or less); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 
66, 69 (1970) (plurality opinion) (deciding that no offense can be labeled “petty” if more 
than a six-month sentence is authorized). 
 38 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968); see also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 
149–50 (1969) (holding that there is no right to jury trial for criminal contempt proceed-
ing where actual sentence imposed was less than six months). 
 39 While the Warren Court’s expansive approach to the procedural protections granted by 
the Sixth Amendment reflected a commitment to safeguarding individual liberty, the 
same “proceduralism . . . reflected an avoidance and suppression of the substantive con-
flicts underlying many of its great cases.”  Kimberlé Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contra-
dictions of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1683, 1713 (1998) (arguing 
that while the Warren Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), granted 
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There was a fundamental shift in the Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence during the Burger Court era from one that stressed 
ensuring governmental compliance with the procedural protections 
guaranteed to defendants by the Sixth Amendment to one that was 
increasingly deferential of law enforcement efforts.40  This fundamen-
tal realignment of the Court’s jurisprudential approach was evident 
not only in its imposition of significant obstacles with regard to the 
ability of federal courts to remedy constitutional violations in habeas 
proceedings,41 but also in its more restrictive view of constitutional 
procedural protections in criminal cases.42 
The Court’s restrictive construction of the Sixth Amendment 
manifested itself in different forms.  In some cases, the restrictive 
construction was a result of the Court’s limitation of the scope of the 
right.  For example, the Burger Court narrowed the class of cases to 
which the right to jury trial applies, finding that it did not apply to 
probation revocation hearings,43 juvenile court proceedings,44 or con-
tempt proceedings where the sentences imposed were subsequently 
reduced to the equivalent of a single term of six months.45  The Court 
similarly narrowed the scope of the right to counsel:  while the Court 
rejected states’ efforts to limit the right to counsel for petty crimes,46 
it restricted the right to felonies and those misdemeanor cases where 
 
welfare recipients the right to a hearing if their benefits were reduced or eliminated, the 
decision did not address the underlying problem of economic disempowerment). 
 40 See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) (describ-
ing the competing due process and crime control models of American criminal proce-
dure); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure:  The Warren and Burger 
Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983) (arguing that the Burger Court’s 
treatment of the Warren Court’s major criminal procedure decisions reflected an ideo-
logical shift toward a “crime control” theory of the criminal justice system); Donald A. 
Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics:  Toward a Unified Theory of Consti-
tutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591 (1990) (providing a critique of 
the modern conservative perspective on the major Warrant Court criminal procedure de-
cisions); see also Luna, supra note 1, at 400 (noting that while neither model identified by 
Packer “corresponds to reality[,] they . . . provide a serviceable method of discussing a 
context-specific system that fluctuates on a daily basis”). 
 41 See Smith, supra note 26, at 1070 (arguing that limiting federal habeas corpus review was a 
“top priority” for the Burger Court). 
 42 Id. (“[M]any Warren Court precedents were curtailed or at least not significantly ex-
tended, and the Court’s application of Warren-era precedents began to take on a dis-
tinctly more prosecution-friendly flavor.”). 
 43 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984). 
 44 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
 45 Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974). 
 46 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972). 
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the defendant is imprisoned.47  The Court also limited the scope of 
the right to counsel by finding that it did not apply to parole or pro-
bation revocation hearings48 or to post-arrest lineups conducted be-
fore the initiation of adverse judicial proceedings.49 
In other instances, the restrictive reading was due to the Burger 
Court’s incorporation within the definitional elements of a constitu-
tional right of a requirement that defendants show that they were 
harmed; the absence of harm precluded the finding of a constitu-
tional violation, in essence making these rights turn on the defen-
dant’s potential guilt or innocence.50  For example, one of the four 
factors set forth by the Court for determining whether the right to 
speedy trial is violated is whether the defendant can demonstrate that 
the delay was prejudicial.51  Similarly, irrespective of how deficient an 
attorney’s performance is, a defendant generally cannot establish a 
violation of the right to counsel without demonstrating that the coun-
sel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.52 
 
 47 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); see also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 223 (1980) 
(holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction cannot be used to enhance the 
sentence of a subsequent misdemeanor conviction to include incarceration), overruled on 
other grounds by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
 48 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973). 
 49 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
 50 While the Warren Court, too, had required a showing of harm through the adoption of 
the harmless error doctrine, that came into play only with regard to remedies—that is, 
only after defendants established a constitutional violation were courts to consider 
whether that error was harmful enough to warrant relief.  By incorporating the harm 
element into the definition of the constitutional right, the Burger Court made it more 
difficult to establish a violation of the right, which had the effect not only of reducing the 
normative value of the right, but also of making the same textual right more meaningful 
for innocent defendants than for those who might be guilty.  In addition, the Burger 
Court’s approach shifted the burden of proof—rather than have the state bear the bur-
den of showing that the constitutional violation was harmless as required by the Warren 
Court’s harmless error doctrine, the Burger Court required the defendant to show the 
harmfulness of the violation. 
 51 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); see also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 
316 (1986). 
 52 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (requiring a defendant to show that coun-
sel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by that deficient 
performance); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981) (finding that relief 
was not warranted for a violation of the right to counsel in a case, despite a deliberate 
government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, because the defendant failed 
to show “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”).  But see United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (holding that prejudice may be presumed when counsel is 
completely absent, is prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the 
proceeding, or fails to subject the state’s case to adversarial testing); Geders v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (finding no showing of prejudice is required when counsel was 
not permitted to consult with defendant during an overnight recess). 
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In a similar vein, the Burger Court read the right of confrontation 
restrictively by incorporating within its definitional elements a show-
ing of unreliability.  In particular, the Court held that the use of out-
of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e. 
hearsay statements, did not offend the Confrontation Clause despite 
the lack of opportunity for the defendant to confront the source of 
the underlying statement not only if the statement fell within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception, but also if the statement bore particular-
ized indicia of reliability.53 
The foregoing is not to suggest that the Burger Court uniformly 
read Sixth Amendment rights restrictively.  On the contrary, there 
were numerous notable expansive readings of the Sixth Amendment 
during this period.  For example, the Court enunciated a broad vi-
sion of the right to a jury trial, finding that it included a right to have 
the jury venire—the pool of potential jurors from which the petit jury 
is selected—reflect a fair cross-section of society.54  The Court also 
read the right to jury trial broadly to require that the trial court ask 
race-specific questions during voir dire in some cases.55  It also read 
the Public Trial Clause expansively to include pre-trial proceedings.56  
In addition, the Court reaffirmed the primacy of the Confrontation 
Clause by finding that a state’s policy interest in protecting the confi-
dentiality of juvenile delinquency records did not supersede the right 
to cross-examine witnesses.57  The Court also read the right to counsel 
expansively58 to extend to critical stages prior to trial,59 post-
 
 53 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004). 
 54 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).  The 
Rehnquist Court subsequently held that this fair cross-section requirement is limited to 
the venire from which the jury is selected; it does not extend to the actual jury seated.  
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
 55 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (finding in an interracial capital case that the trial 
court erred in failing to inform prospective jurors of the victim’s race and questioning 
them on issues of racial bias); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (finding that 
the trial court erred in not asking race-related questions in a case where civil rights issues 
were raised).  But see Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (using supervi-
sory powers to require that federal courts ask race-related questions in non-capital, inter-
racial cases where there is a “reasonable probability” that racial or ethnic prejudice will 
bias the jury); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) (finding no error in failure to ask 
race-related questions in a non-capital case involving an interracial crime because race 
was not integral to the issues in the case). 
 56 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (finding that the closure of a suppression hearing 
violated a defendant’s right to public trial). 
 57 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
 58 The Court, however, restrictively construed the remedy for a violation of this right, hold-
ing that the denial of counsel at critical stages would be subject to harmless error analysis 
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arraignment interrogations,60 post-indictment conversations with po-
lice informants,61 and pre-trial psychiatric examinations;62 to include 
the right to conflict-free representation;63 to include the right of the 
defendant to self-representation;64 and to be the proper subject of a 
claim for habeas relief even regarding an attorney’s incompetent rep-
resentation with respect to a Fourth Amendment issue.65  Finally, the 
Court read the Speedy Trial Clause expansively in holding that the 
only remedy for a speedy trial violation is the dismissal of the indict-
ment with prejudice.66 
Nevertheless, while the Burger Court did read some provisions 
expansively, there was a discernible shift towards a restrictive reading 
of the Sixth Amendment.  Indeed, paradoxically, a number of the 
Burger Court’s expansive readings actually opened the door to future 
restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment.67 
The Rehnquist Court, while imposing significantly greater proce-
dural hurdles than the Burger Court with regard to the ability of fed-
eral courts to effectively remedy constitutional violations in habeas 
proceedings,68 largely mirrored the Burger Court’s jurisprudential 
 
rather than result in automatic reversal.  See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10–11 
(1970) (remanding the case to the trial court for determination of whether denial of 
counsel was harmless error). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977).  A defendant may, however, be questioned 
after invoking the right to counsel if the defendant initiates the communication.  Michi-
gan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). 
 61 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274–75 
(1980) (holding it is a violation of the right to counsel when police placed a paid infor-
mant in the same jail cell as defendant for purposes of obtaining a statement). 
 62 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469–71 (1981). 
 63 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (holding that prejudice is presumed when 
counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 
484–85 (1978) (holding that no showing of prejudice is required when, despite defense 
counsel’s  pretrial warnings of conflict, the trial court failed to inquire into counsel’s con-
flict of interest). 
 64 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975). 
 65 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986). 
 66 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
 67 See discussion of the entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause infra Part III.B and 
discussion of the entanglement of the Public Trial Clause infra Part III.C. 
 68 See Smith, supra note 26, at 1076 (“Although habeas corpus remains available for relitiga-
tion of the constitutionality of state-court convictions, reversal on habeas has become a 
prospect that state courts simply need not be concerned with in the vast majority of cas-
es.”). 
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approach to the Sixth Amendment—while the Court read some pro-
visions expansively, it read many other provisions restrictively.69 
In a pair of decisions during the earlier years of the Rehnquist 
Court, the Court read the Compulsory Process Clause restrictively, 
subjugating it to policy considerations.  First, the Court held that the 
exclusion of testimony as a sanction for defense counsel’s deliberate 
failure to comply with a discovery request did not deny the defen-
dant’s Compulsory Process right to have witnesses testify because 
“[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testi-
mony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system.”70  
Second, the Court held that this right was not violated by the exclu-
sion of evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual relationship with the 
witness because of the defendant’s failure to comply with the notice 
and hearing requirement of the state rape-shield statute.71  Ironically, 
these restrictive readings of Compulsory Process were predicated on 
the earlier expansive reading of this clause by the Burger Court.72 
Just a year after the Rehnquist Court read the Sixth Amendment 
expansively in finding that the Confrontation Clause was violated 
when a screen shielded a child witness from the defendant during 
testimony,73 a sharply divided Court read the right to confrontation 
restrictively in a similar situation.  Specifically, holding that a defen-
dant’s right to face-to-face confrontation must give way when “neces-
sary to further an important public policy and only where the reliabil-
ity of the testimony is otherwise assured,” the Court held that the 
clause was not violated by a statute that allowed a witness to be exam-
ined in a separate room from the defendant, with the testimony be-
ing televised to the courtroom.74 
 
 69 Scholars have pointed to a number of external factors as possible explanations for the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ adoption of a restrictive view of the Sixth Amendment.  
Some have pointed to increased crime and increased politicization of crime.  See Yackle, 
supra note 27, at 2349 (“The crime rate was rising, people were frightened, and society 
needed someone or something to blame.  Eyes fell on the Court, which was suspected of 
abusing its authority to protect the rights of criminal suspects and placing law-abiding 
citizens at risk.”).  Others have alluded to other socioeconomic developments.  See Tho-
mas, supra note 1.  Still others have attributed the change in jurisprudence to the natural 
consequences of a change in the Court’s personnel, reflecting a change in judicial phi-
losophy or ideology, such as increased sensitivity to federalism concerns.  See Archibald 
Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1978). 
 70 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412–13 (1988) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975)). 
 71 Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991). 
 72 See discussion of the entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause infra Part III.B. 
 73 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988). 
 74 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990). 
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The Rehnquist Court largely read the right to counsel restrictively, 
with some notable expansive readings of the right during the final 
years of the Court.  The Court read the Sixth Amendment narrowly 
with respect to the right to effective assistance of counsel,75 the right 
to conflict-free representation,76 the right to elicit statements using 
informants,77 the imposition of hurdles in the defendant’s ability to 
pay counsel’s fees,78 and the scope of the right to counsel.79  At the 
same time, particularly towards the end of the Court’s era, the 
Rehnquist Court did read the right to counsel broadly with respect to 
the scope of the right to counsel,80 effective assistance of counsel,81 
and use of statements elicited in violation of the right to counsel.82 
 
 75 Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2003) (per curiam) (holding counsel was not inef-
fective because decisions to omit certain arguments and to mention defendant’s bad 
character traits to show their irrelevance was a reasonable tactical approach); Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 700 (2002) (finding that counsel was not ineffective because of a 
failure to recall witnesses, and determining that the waiver of a final statement was a stra-
tegic decision because counsel was fearful that presenting mitigating evidence would give 
the prosecution opportunity for a damaging attack). 
 76 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172–74 (2002) (holding that the trial court’s failure to 
inquire into a known potential conflict of interest did not warrant reversal of conviction 
because the defendant did not show that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s per-
formance); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348–49 (1990) (holding that while state-
ments obtained in violation of right to counsel are inadmissible as evidence in the prose-
cution’s case-in-chief, they are admissible for purposes of impeachment); Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (finding that the right to counsel was not violated by a failure 
to grant the defendant a waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel and by a refusal to 
permit the defendant’s proposed substitution of attorneys, because courts have an inde-
pendent duty to protect against potential conflicts of interest); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 
776, 783 (1987) (finding that concurrent representation is not per se a violation of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel). 
 77 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 440, 460–61 (1986) (holding that there is no violation 
of the right to counsel, because the government merely placed the informant in the cell, 
the conversation was entirely spontaneous, the informant asked no questions, and the po-
lice told the informant only to listen for the identities of the accomplices). 
 78 Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (finding that the right to 
counsel was not violated by a forfeiture statute that prevented the payment of attorneys’ 
fees); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989) (finding that the right to 
counsel was not violated by freezing assets that the defendant wanted to use to pay attor-
neys’ fees). 
 79 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 173–74 (1991) (finding that the right to counsel is 
offense-specific and does not provide any protection for unrelated, uncharged offenses). 
 80 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (finding that the right to counsel applies even if 
the sentence imposed is suspended); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (noting that the 
right to counsel extends to uncharged offenses that are considered the same under the 
Blockburger test). 
 81 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (“[E]ven when a capital defendant’s family 
members and the defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is avail-
able, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that 
counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sen-
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The Rehnquist Court’s expansive readings were most pronounced 
in the context of the right of confrontation, particular as to the use of 
hearsay evidence,83 the right to cross-examination,84 and the use of a 
non-testifying confession at a joint trial.85  The Court also read the 
Speedy Trial Clause expansively by finding a violation even where the 
defendant could not show particularized harm due to the delay.86  In 
contrast to these expansive readings of the Sixth Amendment, the 
Court largely read the right to jury trial restrictively.87 
 
tencing phase of trial.”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519 (2003) (finding that coun-
sel’s decision not to present mitigating evidence must be based on reasonable investiga-
tion); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203–04 (2001) (holding that counsel’s error 
at the sentencing phase, which resulted in a sentence increase of six to twenty-one 
months, could be sufficiently prejudicial to constitute ineffective assistance, provided that 
counsel’s performance was unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395, 397 
(2000) (finding that the defendant was denied effective assistance by counsel’s failure to 
investigate and present evidence of defendant’s “nightmarish childhood”); Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483–84 (2000) (holding that prejudice is presumed when the de-
fendant demonstrates reasonable probability that counsel would have filed a timely ap-
peal but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult defendant about the appeal). 
 82 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524–25 (2004) (finding that the defendant’s right 
to counsel was violated by the use of inculpatory statements made during voluntary dis-
cussion in his home, because the discussion took place after the indictment and without 
an informed waiver of right to counsel); Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 686 (1989) (per 
curiam) (holding that the right to counsel was violated because psychiatric examination 
by state experts to determine future dangerousness of the defendant was conducted 
without notice to the defense counsel); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988) 
(finding that the right to counsel was violated when a psychiatric evaluation was con-
ducted without adequate notification to the defense counsel).  But see Buchanan v. Ken-
tucky, 483 U.S. 402, 424 (1987) (declining to find a violation of the right to counsel for 
the prosecution’s use of the defendant’s psychiatric evaluation, because the defense 
counsel had requested the evaluation and presumably informed the defendant about the 
nature of the exam). 
 83 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 84 Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam) (holding that the Confronta-
tion Clause was violated because the defendant was not permitted to cross-examine the 
complainant regarding cohabitation with her boyfriend). 
 85 Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192 (1998) (finding that the Confrontation Clause was 
violated by the admission of a redacted confession that had blank space wherever defen-
dant’s name appeared, and the officer who read confession in court said “deleted” or “de-
letion” instead of the defendant’s name); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987) 
(holding that at a joint trial a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession must be excluded, 
even if it is corroborated by the defendant’s own confession).  But see Richardson v. 
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (finding that at a joint trial a non-testifying co-
defendant’s confession is admissible if it is redacted to eliminate any references to the ex-
istence of someone whom jury would know to be the defendant). 
 86 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). 
 87 Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996) (holding that the right to a jury trial in crimi-
nal contempt cases is determined by aggregating the penalties actually imposed); Hol-
land v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (finding that the fair cross section requirement ap-
plies to venire only, not to a seated jury); Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 
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Finally, while it is far too early in the Roberts Court’s tenure to au-
thoritatively evaluate its approach to the Sixth Amendment, its initial 
decisions contravene the popular characterization of the Court as be-
ing less protective of individual liberty in criminal prosecutions.  
While such a reputation might well be reflected in the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence88 or its jurisprudence in capital cases,89 the 
Court decidedly has read the Sixth Amendment expansively in a 
number of decisions involving the right to confrontation,90 compul-
sory process,91 and counsel.92  It remains, however, far from clear 
whether this limited jurisprudence evidences a deeply rooted com-
mitment to an expansive reading of the Sixth Amendment or simply 
a historical accident due to the particular issues raised by the first set 
of Sixth Amendment cases to come before the Court.93 
It is, thus, evident that after a long period of dormancy, the 
Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence underwent significant 
change during the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, with the 
scope and meaning of the provisions of the Sixth Amendment wit-
nessing a series of expansive and restrictive readings.  During the 
course of this jurisprudential change, the Court adopted several tex-
tually inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment.  For example, 
contrary to the textual mandate that its procedural protections be 
provided in “all” prosecutions, the Court had held that the rights to 
counsel and jury trial only apply in subsets of prosecutions, and that 
too in differing subsets.94  Moreover, going beyond the text, the Court 
has expanded the scope of the Compulsory Process Clause to include 
 
(1989) (reaffirming that the right to a jury trial exists only in the prosecutions for serious 
crimes). 
 88 See John D. Castiglione, Hudson and Samson:  The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy, Dignity, 
and the Fourth Amendment, 68 LA. L. REV. 63, 64 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
“curtailing of generally accepted Fourth Amendment protections” after the departure of 
Justice O’Connor). 
 89 See Kenneth C. Haas, The Emerging Death Penalty Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 6 PIERCE 
L. REV. 387, 388 (2008) (arguing that, even as societal concerns with the death penalty 
have grown, the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence in these cases “has loosened the standards 
for evaluating the competence of capital defense attorneys, strengthened the hands of 
capital prosecutors, and upheld strict and constitutionally vulnerable statutory and pro-
cedural roadblocks to the appellate review of capital sentences”). 
 90 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
 91 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
 92 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008); Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 
(2008); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006). 
 93 See Stone, supra note 2, at 1534 (opining that the Roberts Court is not protecting funda-
mental constitutional values). 
 94 See discussion of the entanglement of the Predicate Clause infra Part III.A. 
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a right to have witnesses testify and has expanded the scope of the 
right of public trials to include the right to public pre-trial proceed-
ings.95  Furthermore, by requiring that defendants show some harm 
in order to demonstrate a violation the Speedy Trial, Confrontation, 
and Counsel Clauses, the Court contravened the textual mandate 
that these provisions apply in all prosecutions, including those of per-
sons who might well be guilty.96 
Following a discussion in Part II of the Court’s two recent seminal 
decisions disentangling the Sixth Amendment, in Part III, this Article 
discusses each of the Court’s textually inconsistent readings, explain-
ing how each is the result of the Court’s entanglement of the Sixth 
Amendment with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
II.  AT  A  CROSSROADS:  THE  RECENT  DISENTANGLEMENT OF THE 
SIXTH  AMENDMENT 
The past few years have witnessed two particularly critical devel-
opments in the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  Commen-
tators have celebrated or decried Apprendi v. New Jersey97 and Crawford 
v. Washington98 and their progeny, noting the important changes they 
marked in the Court’s sentencing and Confrontation Clause juris-
prudences respectively.  As discussed below, however, these two lines 
of cases are better seen as part of the same effort to disentangle the 
Sixth Amendment from the Fourteenth Amendment and revert to a 
more textually-grounded jurisprudence. 
A.  The “All Criminal Prosecutions” Predicate 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court, citing both the Due 
Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment, struck down a state sen-
tencing statute that authorized a higher penalty if the sentencing 
judge, rather than a jury, found that the defendant had committed a 
hate crime.99  Since the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was pre-
 
 95 See infra Parts III.B, III.C, which discuss the entanglement of the Compulsory Process and 
Public Trial Clauses, respectively. 
 96 See infra Parts III.D, III.E, III.F, which discuss the entanglement of the Speedy Trial, Con-
frontation, and Counsel Clauses, respectively. 
 97 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 98 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 99 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.  The Court subsequently struck down sentencing guideline 
schemes that required the sentencing judge to impose a higher sentence than that which 
would automatically follow the jury’s verdict at trial.  See Cunningham v. California, 549 
U.S. 270 (2007) (striking down California’s Determinate Sentencing Law); United States 
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viously understood to apply only at trials,100 Apprendi and its progeny 
have been both celebrated and criticized by scholars for having ex-
tended that right to a subset of sentencing proceedings.101  These 
cases, however, are better understood as an attempt to define the 
contours of the Sixth Amendment’s unambiguous, but often forgot-
ten predicate—namely that its procedural protections, including the 
right to a jury trial, apply to “all criminal prosecutions.”102  In other 
words, as discussed below, rather than extending the right to a jury 
trial to sentencing proceedings, Apprendi and its progeny are better 
viewed as having disentangled the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, locating some sentencing proceedings—those that constitute 
“criminal prosecutions”—within the scope of the Sixth Amendment. 
Prior to, and for a period shortly following, the adoption of the 
Sixth Amendment, the underlying criminal conviction and the result-
ing sentence were strictly connected, with the legislature having 
specified fixed punishments for every crime.103  Since the trial judge 
automatically imposed a pre-determined fixed sentence after the 
conviction, there were no meaningfully distinct sentencing proceed-
ings.104  In other words, a criminal prosecution included both the 
conviction and sentence.  As such, the procedural protections of the 
Sixth Amendment applied to determinations of sentence as much as 
they applied to determinations of guilt. 
The fundamental shift in sentencing policy in the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, led to the development of distinct sentencing proceed-
 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005) (striking down mandatory federal sentencing guide-
lines); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (striking down Washington’s manda-
tory sentencing guidelines). 
100 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (noting that the Sixth Amendment never 
has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury’s determination of the appropriate pun-
ishment to be imposed on an individual); see also Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentenc-
ing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771 (2003) (discussing which rights are protected at the sentencing 
stage). 
101 See generally Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker:  
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 216 (2005); Kyron 
Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 389 (2002); Benjamin J. Priester, 
Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
281 (2001); Keven R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum:  Policy and Constitutional Law at 
Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1122 (2005); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, 
History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243 (2001). 
102 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
103 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478–79 . 
104 See Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog:  Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 302 (1992) (“The 
facts on which sentencing was based were decided by the jury, so there was little need for 
a separate proceeding.”). 
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ings.  More than a century preceding modern sentencing reforms, 
states adopted indeterminate sentencing schemes, affording trial 
judges considerable discretion in fashioning a sentence.105  Under 
these schemes, whose goal was the rehabilitation of offenders, judges 
were to make individualized sentencing decisions that could be based 
on factors not involved in the determination of guilt, such as defen-
dants’ criminal history and personal characteristics.106 
It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the Court con-
fronted the question of what constitutional rights were implicated by 
these distinct sentencing proceedings.  In Williams v. New York,107 the 
Court faced a constitutional challenge to New York’s sentencing pro-
cedures.  A New York jury had convicted the defendant of first-degree 
murder and had recommended a life sentence; the judge, however, 
overrode the jury’s recommendation and imposed a death sentence, 
finding that the defendant was a “menace to society.”108  Since the 
judge’s conclusions at sentencing were based on evidence that had 
not been presented to the jury (including hearsay allegations of the 
defendant’s “morbid sexuality” and that the defendant, although not 
convicted, had been involved in thirty other crimes), the defendant 
challenged both the lack of notice about this additional evidence and 
the lack of a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses.109 
Since Williams was a state case, it was not surprising that the de-
fendant, and the Court, viewed these constitutional claims solely 
through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.  After all, the Sixth Amendment, which since the time of the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights had been understood to apply only to 
the federal government, had not yet been incorporated via the Four-
teenth Amendment and made applicable to the states.110  In finding 
that the imposition of the death sentence in Williams did not violate 
the Due Process Clause, the Court distinguished between determina-
tions of guilt and determinations of sentence, finding that the latter 
properly were governed by different rules.111 
 
105 Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern 
Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 278 (2005). 
106 Id. 
107 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
108 Id.  at 242–44. 
109 Id. 
110 See infra text accompanying note 23, which discusses the incorporation of the Sixth 
Amendment by the Warren Court in the 1960s. 
111 337 U.S. at 252. 
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The Court’s provision of lesser rights at sentencing in state courts 
in Williams was consonant with traditional Due Process analysis, 
whereby the extent of procedural protections granted by the Due 
Process Clause was calibrated to the type of proceeding and interest 
involved.112  This does not mean that the outcome of Williams was 
proper—indeed, since the right to notice is one of the most basic, 
elemental components of even minimal due process, an argument 
can be made that the Court erred in denying the constitutional claim 
in Williams.  But, for purposes of this Article, the important point is 
not that the outcome in Williams might or might not be proper, but 
rather that the Court relied on traditional Due Process analysis, not 
the Sixth Amendment, in bifurcating the underlying determinations 
of guilt from determinations of sentence and granting lesser protec-
tions in the latter.113 
Distinct sentencing proceedings remained the norm even as the 
country veered back to determinate sentencing.  Beginning in the 
1960s, concerns began to be raised about both the goals of punish-
ment and the methods of sentencing.  Specifically, “[r]esearchers 
and commentators contended that efforts to rehabilitate the offend-
ers had proved largely ineffective and that broad judicial sentencing 
discretion produced unjustifiable differences in the sentence meted 
out to similar defendants.”114  These concerns led to a shift towards 
the retributive goals of punishment and determinate sentencing, with 
many states, and the federal government, adopting “new determinate 
 
112 See Todd Meadow, Note, Almendarez-Torres v. United States:  Constitutional Limitations on 
Government’s Power to Define Crimes, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1583, 1583 (1999) (“The level of pro-
tection an accused receives under the Due Process Clause often varies with the type of 
proceeding at issue and depends on the interests a criminal defendant has at stake.”).  
For example, administrative hearings implicate a less robust construction of due process.  
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  Importantly, in recent years, the Court has re-
jected the Mathews approach for determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause was violated during a state criminal trial.  See Medina v. California, 505 
U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (stating that the Mathews test is not the proper framework to use 
when assessing the validity of state procedural rules which are part of the criminal proc-
ess).  Instead of using a balancing analysis, the Court now asks whether the state practice 
in question “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience 
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” id. at 445, or whether it “transgresses any 
recognized principle of ‘fundamental fairness’ in operation,” id. at 448. 
113 This left open the question of whether sentencing proceedings in federal court would 
continue to be bound by the Sixth Amendment, as at the time of the Founding, or 
whether they would fall instead within the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. 
114 Berman, supra note 105, at 279. 
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sentencing systems based on ‘guidelines’ that would help to channel 
the discretion of the sentencer.”115 
Almost four decades after Williams, the Court addressed the impli-
cation of constitutional rights by the new determinate sentencing 
schemes.  McMillan v. Pennsylvania involved a constitutional chal-
lenge to a state statute that required a judge to impose a mandatory 
minimum sentence if a defendant possessed a firearm during the 
commission of certain felonies.116  Under the statute, the requisite 
factfinding of firearm possession was to be made not by the jury at 
the guilt phase, but rather by the judge at sentencing.117  While the 
defendants raised Due Process claims regarding burdens and stan-
dards of proof, they also raised a Sixth Amendment claim that the 
state scheme violated the right to a jury trial.  In summarily rejecting 
this claim, the Court stated simply:  “[W]e need only note that there 
is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing . . . .”118 
The Court’s decision in McMillan, thus, adopted the earlier, Due 
Process-based, bifurcation of guilt and sentencing proceedings in the 
context of the Sixth Amendment, entangling the two clauses.  What 
was a perfectly appropriate Due Process analysis in Williams had now 
been adopted in the Sixth Amendment context, with no discussion of 
the text or history of the Sixth Amendment.  While the Court’s hold-
ing in McMillan dealt with state sentencing proceedings, this entan-
glement had important implications for federal sentencing proceed-
ings.  As noted earlier, since a “criminal prosecution” at the time of 
the Founding involved both determinations of guilt and determina-
tions of sentence, all provisions of the Sixth Amendment applied at 
that time to federal sentencing proceedings.  By now finding that the 
right to a jury trial did not apply to sentencing proceedings, the 
Court in McMillan essentially held that sentencing proceedings fall 
outside the scope of criminal prosecutions.  In other words, a crimi-
nal prosecution terminates with the determination of guilt; the sub-
sequent determination of sentence in federal court is governed only 
by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
The Court in McMillan, moreover, adopted a formalistic distinc-
tion between factfindings to be made by the jury during determina-
tions of guilt and those that could be made by the judge at sentenc-
 
115 Joseph L. Hoffman, Apprendi v. New Jersey:  Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 
265 (2001). 
116 477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986). 
117 Id. at 81 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982)). 
118 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93. 
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ing proceedings.  Finding itself unable “to lay down any ‘bright line’ 
test,”119 the Court gave heavy weight to whether the legislature labeled 
the fact an “element of the crimes” or a “sentencing factor.”120  While 
it acknowledged that “there are constitutional limits to the State’s 
power in this regard,” the Court concluded that “the state legisla-
ture’s definition . . . is usually dispositive.”121 
The McMillan majority’s formalistic approach for determining 
whether a factual determination is part of the “criminal prosecution” 
or part of a sentencing proceeding, while in keeping with the 
Rehnquist Court’s emphasis on federalism, drew dissents from Jus-
tices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, who objected to the 
Court’s abdication of its responsibility to define the scope of constitu-
tional protections.  These Justices argued that undue deference to 
legislatures would permit states to circumvent constitutional re-
quirements, including the protections of the Sixth Amendment, by 
simply labeling essential facts as being “sentencing factors.”122 
Over time, other members of the Court began to voice similar 
concerns.  For example, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, Justice 
Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, 
found the deference to the legislature inappropriate where the stat-
ute did not expressly indicate that the fact at issue was a “sentencing 
enhancement” and in fact seemed to indicate the opposite.123  The 
following year, in Jones v. United States, the Court went further—even 
though the structure of the statute had led both the district court and 
the court of appeals to find that the facts at issue were “sentencing 
enhancements” and not “elements of offenses,” the majority found 
that it was not an adequate indicium of legislative intent.124 
It was in dictum in Jones that the Court first articulated the princi-
ple by which it would independently distinguish (without undue def-
erence to the legislature) between “elements of offenses” and “sen-
tencing factors.”  In a footnote, the majority stated that “any fact 
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for 
 
119 Id. at 91. 
120 Id. at 85–86.  If gun possession belonged in the former category, it would be part of a 
“‘criminal prosecution,’” subject to the Sixth Amendment’s right to jury trial and would 
need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecutor; if it belonged to the lat-
ter category, it would fall outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment.  This formalistic re-
liance on the label assigned by the legislature mirrored the approach the Court had 
taken in distinguishing between elements of offenses and affirmative defenses. 
121 Id. at 86. 
122 Id. at 93–94 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 95–104 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
123 523 U.S. 224, 249 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
124 526 U.S. 227, 231–34 (1999). 
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a crime” must comply with the notice and jury trial guarantees of the 
Sixth Amendment.125 
This principle formed the basis for the Court’s decision in Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey to strike down a statute that permitted the imposi-
tion of a higher sentence if the sentencing judge found that the un-
derlying crime was also a hate crime.126  While the New Jersey 
legislature had set forth unambiguously the hate crime provision in 
the statutory section titled “Sentencing,” the Court refused to defer to 
the legislature.  Instead, the Court, recognizing its obligation to de-
fine independently the scope of constitutional provisions, adopted 
the principle announced in dictum in Jones and held that “[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be sub-
mitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”127 
While the majority opinion in Apprendi relied on historical and 
policy grounds to justify its holding, the concurring opinions pro-
vided a textual grounding for the Apprendi rule.  Justice Thomas, in 
an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, tethered the issue to the word 
“crime” because three constitutional provisions were predicated on 
this word:  (1) the Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusation”; (2) the Fifth Amendment right in 
federal cases to a grand jury indictment; and (3) the Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury trial.128  Since “[a]ll of these constitutional protec-
tions turn on determining which facts constitute the ‘crime’—that is, 
which facts are the ‘elements’ or ‘ingredients’ of a crime,” Justice 
Thomas explained, “it is critical to know which facts are elements.”129 
The textual tether for the Apprendi rule provided by Justice Tho-
mas, while on the right track, missed the mark.  For example, the 
word “crime” arises in the Sixth Amendment’s Jury Trial Clause only 
insofar as to indicate the appropriate jurisdiction from which the jury 
should be drawn; it does not have any implication for the scope of 
the jury’s factfinding task at the trial.  Instead, Justice Scalia alluded 
 
125 Id. at 243 n.6. 
126 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
127 Id. at 490.  In subsequent cases, the Court interpreted the “statutory maximum” penalty 
in a restrictive manner and struck down state and federal mandatory sentencing guide-
line schemes to the extent they required the sentencing judge to impose a sentence 
higher than that which could be imposed based solely on the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 
288–89 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004). 
128 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
129 Id. at 500. 
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to the proper textual tether for the Apprendi rule when he concluded 
in his concurring opinion that “the guarantee that ‘[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial, by an impar-
tial jury,’ has no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts 
which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally pre-
scribed punishment must be found by the jury.”130  Plainly stated, the 
Sixth Amendment’s predicate clause— “in all criminal prosecutions” 
—presupposes prosecutions of “crimes” and as such, facts that consti-
tute elements of crime are properly adjudicated as part of the “prose-
cution” subject to the procedural protections granted to defendants 
by Sixth Amendment.  In other words, irrespective of legislative label-
ing, facts that increase the statutory maximum penalty are part of the 
initial “criminal prosecution,” not the subsequent “sentencing.” 
Apprendi and its progeny, thus, are best seen not as having ex-
tended the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to a subset of sentenc-
ing proceedings, but rather as a reclamation of that subset of sentenc-
ing proceedings within the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s “all 
criminal prosecutions” predicate clause. 
B.  Right of Confrontation 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “In all criminal prosecutions 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him.”131  This Confrontation Clause, which has been 
understood to involve at its core four procedural safeguards (in per-
son testimony by witnesses; testimony given under oath; testimony 
that is subject to cross-examination; and testimony where the jury can 
observe the witness’s demeanor),132 has broad implications for the use 
of out-of-court statements that are presented in support of the truth 
of the matter asserted—i.e., hearsay evidence.  At one extreme, the 
clause could be read as precluding any evidence that a defendant is 
unable to confront personally, resulting in the exclusion of all hear-
say evidence;133 at the other extreme, it could be read narrowly as ap-
plying only to persons who are offering testimony in court, allowing 
the use of any hearsay consistent with rules of evidence.134  As dis-
cussed below, prior to the landmark decision in Crawford v. Washing-
 
130 Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (first emphasis added). 
131 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
132 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990). 
133 Philip Halpren, The Confrontation Clause and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 37 BUFF. 
L. REV. 165, 165 (1988–89). 
134 Id. at 165–66. 
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ton,135 the manner in which the Supreme Court attempted to steer a 
middle course led to the needless entanglement of Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence with Due Process considerations. 
The path to entanglement began over a century ago in Mattox v. 
United States when the Court rejected a defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause claim in a case in which prior testimony from two witnesses 
was admitted at a subsequent trial that occurred after these witnesses 
had died.136  Since the defendant had been afforded a full opportu-
nity to confront these witnesses at the initial trial, the Court felt that 
“considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case” re-
quired that the prior recorded testimony be admitted despite the 
strict requirements of the Confrontation Clause.137  Notably, in dic-
tum, the Court drew an analogy to the admissibility of “dying declara-
tions,” a category of hearsay evidence that traditionally has been ad-
mitted despite obvious Confrontation Clause problems.138 
The Mattox Court’s linking, albeit in dictum, of the Confrontation 
Clause and the rules of evidence paved the way for the future entan-
gling of the Sixth Amendment with due process concerns by affirm-
ing the ability of courts to “admit out-of-court statements that were 
just as reliable as those covered by the traditional exceptions without 
finding a constitutional violation.”139  In Dutton v. Evans,140 for exam-
ple, “Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion brought the reliability theme 
to center stage.”141  The Court upheld the defendant’s conviction 
even though the trial court had admitted the hearsay testimony of a 
jailhouse snitch, finding that there were sufficient “indicia of reliabil-
ity.”142  Notably, Justice Stewart claimed that “the mission of the Con-
frontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of 
the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that ‘the 
trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the 
prior statement.’”143 
A decade later, the Court fully embraced the centrality of reliabil-
ity concerns in resolving Confrontation Clause claims in Ohio v. Rob-
 
135 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
136 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
137 Id. at 243–44. 
138 Id. 
139 John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility:  Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the 
Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 202 (1999). 
140 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
141 Douglass, supra note 139, at 203. 
142 Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 (plurality opinion). 
143 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)). 
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erts.144  In approving the use of transcribed testimony from a prior pre-
liminary hearing where the defendant had been provided an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witness, the Court restated its narrow view 
of the “underlying purpose” of the Confrontation Clause as being 
merely “to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring 
the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence.”145  The 
Court then explored the relationship between the Confrontation 
Clause and hearsay evidence and identified two principles at work.  
First, for hearsay evidence to be admissible, the declarant generally 
must be unavailable at trial.146  Second, the hearsay evidence must 
bear “adequate indicia of reliability,” such as “fall[ing] within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception” or having “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”147  As one scholar concluded:  “Reliability has be-
come the surrogate for cross-examination.  ‘Firmly rooted’ hearsay 
exceptions are the surrogate for reliability.  The Confrontation 
Clause is simply an exclusionary rule for unreliable hearsay, and the 
law of evidence largely defines the rule.”148 
While the Court used this reliability framework subsequently to 
resolve several Confrontation Clause cases,149 some members of the 
Court began to voice misgivings about the Court’s approach.150  In a 
prescient concurring opinion in White v. Illinois, Justice Thomas, who 
was joined in the opinion by Justice Scalia, noted that “Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps incon-
sistent with the text and history of the Clause itself.”151  The Court’s 
approach, Justice Thomas added, had led to the entangling of the 
 
144 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
145 Id. at 65. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 65–66. 
148 Douglass, supra note 139, at 206; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword, Sixth Amendment First 
Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641 (1996); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation:  The Search for Basic 
Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1015 (1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s subsequent treatment 
of this framework has tended to make confrontation doctrine resemble ordinary hearsay 
law.”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 
UCLA L. REV. 557, 622 (1988) (“[E]vidence law now controls the content of the confron-
tation clause . . . .”). 
149 See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho 
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
150 Scholars also criticized the Court’s approach.  As one scholar noted, the Court had at-
tempted to “achieve harmony” between two opposing interpretations of the clause “by 
rendering the preservation of procedural fairness subservient to the pursuit of substantive 
justice in the form of accurate verdicts.”  Halpren, supra note 133, at 200. 
151 502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Sixth Amendment jurisprudence with Due Process:  “[r]eliability,” 
Justice Thomas noted, “is more properly a due process concern.”152 
A little over a decade later, Justice Thomas’s position gained ma-
jority support in Crawford v. Washington.153  In an opinion written by 
Justice Scalia, the Court disentangled the Confrontation Clause from 
due process considerations, stating that while “the Clause’s ultimate 
goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, . . . it is a procedural rather 
than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence be re-
liable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:  by test-
ing in the crucible of cross-examination.”154 
Having disentangled the Sixth Amendment, the Court then of-
fered a new approach to Confrontation Clause issues.  Drawing on 
the historical background of the clause,155 the Court concluded that 
the use of testimonial156 hearsay evidence would be permissible under 
the Confrontation Clause only if the declarant was unavailable and 
the defendant had been provided a prior opportunity for cross-
examination;157 non-testimonial hearsay evidence, on the other hand, 
would not be regulated by the Confrontation Clause and would, in-
stead, be subject only to state rules of evidence.158 
Crawford, thus, “represents a sea change in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.”159  It 
marks a clear effort by the Court to disentangle the Sixth Amend-
ment from Due Process considerations and to revert to an approach 
more consistent with the clause’s text. 
 
152 Id. at 363–64. 
153 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
154 Id. at 61. 
155 Id. at 42–56.  In charting this new course, the Court found that the Amendment’s text was 
not helpful because it was susceptible to a number of reasonable, competing interpreta-
tions.  Id. at 42. 
156 Id. at 68–69.  In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), the Court drew the follow-
ing distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the inter-
rogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are 
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongo-
ing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 
157 The Court noted that the dying declaration hearsay exception has long been recognized.  
Without reaching the question of whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates such an 
exception to the Confrontation Clause, the Court stated that “[i]f this exception must be 
accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.”  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
158 Id. at 68. 
159 W. Jeremy Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Wash-
ington:  Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 22 (2005). 
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III. THE ROAD AHEAD:  ENTANGLEMENTS YET TO BE UNDONE 
The Court’s adoption of textually inconsistent readings of the 
Sixth Amendment over the course of the past few decades can be 
traced to the interplay between the Sixth Amendment and the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  As discussed in Part III.A 
below, the Court entangled the two constitutional provisions in the 
process of incorporating the Sixth Amendment, leading to a textually 
inconsistent restrictive reading of the scope of the right to counsel.  
Parts III.B and III.C, which address the Compulsory Process and Pub-
lic Trial Clauses respectively, discuss how the Court entangled the 
Sixth Amendment by improperly locating expansive procedural pro-
tections in the particularized rules of the Sixth Amendment as op-
posed to deriving the same rights from the general principle of due 
process.  Finally, as discussed in Parts III.D, III.E, and III.F, the Court 
entangled the Sixth Amendment with the Due Process Clause by us-
ing interpretative methodologies suitable for the Due Process Clause 
to give meaning to the Sixth Amendment’s text.  Each of the entan-
glements discussed below has led to a more restrictive reading of the 
Sixth Amendment, rendering it less protective of individual liberty. 
A.  The “All Criminal Prosecutions” Predicate 
The Sixth Amendment unequivocally mandates that its seven pro-
cedural protections be provided to defendants “in all criminal prose-
cutions.”160  Despite this unbound predicate, the Court has read into 
the text a limitation about the scope of the right to assistance of 
counsel, finding that this right is available only in limited subsets of 
federal (and state) prosecutions.  This construction of the right to 
counsel, arguably the unintended result of incorporation, is all the 
more problematic in light of the Court’s earlier erroneous limitation 
of the right to a jury trial to a different subset of federal (and state) 
prosecutions.  Thus, while the Sixth Amendment’s common predi-
cate continues to mean in all criminal prosecutions for five proce-
dural rights, it has come to mean only in some criminal prosecutions 
for two procedural rights, and this some varies according to which of 
the two procedural rights is involved.  As discussed below, this textu-
ally inconsistent construction can be traced to the entanglement of 
the Sixth Amendment with the Due Process Clause. 
 
160 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added). 
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Since its ratification in 1791, the Sixth Amendment has guaran-
teed defendants in all criminal prosecutions in federal court the right 
to the assistance of counsel.161  With respect to state court prosecu-
tions, on the other hand, prior to 1963, the Court had rejected the 
claim that this right to counsel was applicable to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment;162 the Court had instead conducted a case-
specific review to determine whether a state’s failure to appoint coun-
sel violated a defendant’s due process rights.163  The Court changed 
direction during the early years of the Warren Court, holding in Gide-
on v. Wainwright that the right to the assistance of counsel was so 
“fundamental and essential to a fair trial” that it was applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.164 
Less than a decade after Gideon, the Court reaffirmed its clarion 
call by rejecting states’ attempts to limit its scope to serious (that is, 
non-petty) offenses in Argersinger v. Hamlin.165  In doing so, however, 
the Court used problematic language.  Perhaps with a desire to 
achieve unanimity—there was not a single dissent in Argersinger v. 
Hamlin—the Court held that “no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless 
he was represented by counsel at his trial.”166 
Argersinger’s post hoc focus on whether the defendant is impris-
oned after a trial without counsel was noteworthy not only for its fail-
ure to provide meaningful pre-conviction guidance to state courts on 
 
161 This right has long been found to include the right of indigent defendants in federal 
cases to have the government provide them with an attorney.  See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938).  Even during the common law, while indigent defendants had 
no right to have attorneys appointed, and indeed no defendant had the right to have the 
assistance of counsel, “[i]t was dogma that the court was meant to serve as counsel for the 
prisoner.”  John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1049–50 (1994).  It should be noted, however, 
that this entitlement to the assistance of the trial judge as defense counsel at the common 
law was limited to matters of law:  “[T]he judges would protect defendants against illegal 
procedure, faulty indictments, and the like.”  Id. at 1051.  As to issues of fact, judges did 
not “help the accused to formulate a defense or act as their advocates[, although] judges 
did intervene on occasion to help the defendant in the realm of fact, mainly by cross-
examining a suspicious prosecution witness when the defendant appeared ineffectual.”  
Id. at 1051–52. 
162 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–73 (1942) (holding that there is no right to counsel 
under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
163 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (discussing English common law and state 
application of right). 
164 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963). 
165 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
166 Id. at 37. 
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whether to provide defendants with counsel,167 but also because it also 
opened the door seven years later to a retrenchment of the right to 
counsel.  In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Scott v. Illinois held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply to all prosecutions 
in state courts, but only to those cases in which the defendant was ac-
tually imprisoned.168 
Mindful perhaps of Scott’s tortured reasoning, a differently consti-
tuted, yet similarly split, Court later found in Alabama v. Shelton that 
the Sixth Amendment not only applies to those misdemeanor cases 
in state courts in which the defendant is actually imprisoned, but also 
in those cases where the defendant, while not actually imprisoned, 
was sentenced to imprisonment and that sentence was suspended.169 
The Court’s approach in Argersinger, Scott, and Shelton would pose 
no issue in terms of entanglement of the Sixth Amendment if it were 
limited to state prosecutions.  While it is true that as a general matter, 
the substance of each of the Sixth Amendment’s procedural protec-
tions is identical in state and federal prosecutions,170 the same need 
not be true of the predicate “in all criminal prosecutions” clause.  
This predicate clause speaks not to the substantive meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections, but to their scope.  The 
Framers of the Sixth Amendment were acutely concerned about the 
powers of a central government, quite the opposite of the concerns 
driving the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  So, the Court 
could have held that, while the substantive meaning of the right to 
counsel is identical in federal and state prosecutions, the right to 
counsel applies to different sets of prosecutions:  while it applies to all 
federal prosecutions, it only applies to a subset of state prosecutions, 
those where its presence is essential to a fair trial.171  Such a disentan-
 
167 See Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel:  Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 601, 604 (1975); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player:  Alter-
nating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2426 n.31 (1996). 
168 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (“[T]he central premise of Argersinger . . . warrants adop-
tion of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment 
of counsel.”). 
169 535 U.S. 654, 657, 674 (2002).  See generally Rinat Kitai, What Remains Necessary Following 
Alabama v. Shelton to Fulfill the Right of a Criminal Defendant to Counsel at the Expense of the 
State?, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35 (2004). 
170 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 183 (noting that once a procedural right is incorporated, 
“the Court treats the Fourteenth Amendment right and the Bill of Rights right as identi-
cal protections”); id. (noting other than the size and unanimity of juries, the substance of 
all provisions of the Sixth Amendment that have been incorporated to the states are iden-
tical in federal and state prosecutions.) 
171 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 
1260–84 (1992) (discussing the theory of refined incorporation). 
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gled reading would have allowed the Court to adopt the current ap-
proach to state prosecutions and would not have changed federal 
practice much since the overwhelming majority of federal prosecu-
tions are for felonies.172 
The Court, however, has failed to limit its Argersinger, Scott, and 
Shelton approach to state prosecutions.  While not expressly address-
ing the issue, the Court in Nichols v. United States implicitly assumed 
that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in federal court is con-
stitutional.173  Overturning its earlier decision in Baldasar v. Illinois,174 
the Court held in Nichols that an uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tion can be used in a later counseled criminal proceeding to enhance 
a defendant’s sentence in federal prosecutions.175 
The Court’s failure to disentangle the right to counsel, thus, has 
led to a textually inconsistent construction of the Sixth Amendment:  
while the text unambiguously extends the right to counsel to “all 
criminal prosecutions” in federal court, the Court has not extended 
the right to those misdemeanor prosecutions where the defendant is 
not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
The Court’s textually inconsistent reading also is not faithful to 
the history of the right to counsel.  Under the common law, while a 
person charged with a felony or treason was denied the assistance of 
counsel, the right to counsel was guaranteed in civil cases and mis-
demeanors.176  The colonists also extended the right to misdemeanor 
cases—in almost every instance, the colonies adopted provisions 
guaranteeing the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal 
 
172 See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation:  Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 254 n.4 (1982) (“The 
number of federal misdemeanor prosecutions (including both 18 U.S.C. § 3401 misde-
meanors and 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) petty offenses), however, is so low—approximately 100,000 
in 1980—that one can safely say that state prosecutions account for more than 98% of all 
misdemeanor prosecutions.”). 
173 511 U.S. 738 (1994).  There is some question about the continued viability of Nichols in 
some circumstances.  As noted earlier, the Court has since held that facts that lead to 
punishment beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See supra Part II.  While the Court has exempted prior convictions from this rule, 
those cases have all involved jury findings of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  In uncounseled misdemeanor cases 
where the authorized punishment is less than six months (and therefore where there is 
no right to a jury trial), there would be no initial jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.  
As a result, the future use of such a conviction may well require that a jury in the subse-
quent proceeding make a finding of the predicate facts underlying the misdemeanor 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 
174  446 U.S. 222 (1980). 
175 Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746–47. 
176 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932). 
 
520 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
proceedings.177  The Framers undoubtedly were familiar with the ex-
tension of the right to counsel to misdemeanors under the common 
law and in the colonies when they adopted the “in all criminal prose-
cutions” predicate in the Sixth Amendment. 
The Court’s textually inconsistent construction of the right to 
counsel proves all the more problematic when considered in con-
junction with the Court’s construction of the predicate clause with 
regard to the other Sixth Amendment rights.  Specifically, the Court 
has held that the right to jury trial does not apply to petty crimes—
that is, crimes for which the potential punishment is six months or 
less.178  At the same time, the Court has not qualified the predicate 
clause with respect to the other five procedural rights in the Sixth 
Amendment.  As such, the same text has been endowed with three 
different meanings.  “In all criminal prosecutions” means the follow-
ing:  in the context of the right to counsel, it means “in felony prose-
cutions and misdemeanor prosecutions where the defendant is actu-
ally sentenced to a term of imprisonment”; in the context of the right 
to jury trial, it means “in non-petty criminal prosecutions”; and in the 
context of the rights to a public trial, a speedy trial, notice, confronta-
tion and compulsory process, it continues to mean “in all criminal 
prosecutions.” 
Furthermore, insofar as the Court drew inspiration from its earlier 
jurisprudence limiting the Predicate Clause in the jury trial context, 
such reliance was misplaced.  This is because the Court’s jury trial ju-
risprudence was fundamentally flawed.  In concluding that the petty 
trials fell outside the scope of the right to jury trial, the Court had fo-
cused on the word “criminal” in the predicate clause.179  Referring to 
Blackstone’s definition of a “crime,” the Court found that the word 
had two meanings:  while a broad reading of the word covered all 
criminal activity, including misdemeanors, a narrow reading of the 
word covered only “offenses . . . of a deeper and more atrocious 
 
177 See id. at 61–64.  Colonies that had constitutional provisions guaranteeing counsel in all 
criminal prosecutions were Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey.  Id.  North Carolina and South Carolina did not have 
constitutional provisions, but each adopted this guarantee by statute.  Id.  Virginia had no 
constitutional guarantee but had an act that permitted the accused in a capital case to 
have counsel.  Connecticut did not have a constitutional provision but expressly rejected 
the English rule.  Id.  The practice in Georgia is unclear prior to the adoption of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Rhode Island had a statute that permitted an indicted person to employ 
counsel.  Id. 
178 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73–74 (1970) (plurality opinion). 
179 Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904). 
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dye.”180  “[S]maller faults and omissions of less consequence,” on the 
other hand, “are comprised under the gentler name of ‘misdemean-
ors’ only” under the narrow reading.181  The Court then discussed the 
adoption of the right to a jury trial in Article III, noting that the text 
of the jury trial provision in Article III182 had been changed at the 
Constitutional Convention from “‘the trial of all criminal of-
fenses . . . shall be by jury’” to “‘the trial of all crimes.’”183  In other 
words, by adopting “crimes” instead of “all criminal offenses,” the 
Court found that the Framers intended to adopt the narrow defini-
tion of “crime,” the one that excluded misdemeanor offenses from its 
scope. 
The Court’s reading of the text, however, was fundamentally 
flawed.  First, “Blackstone himself impeache[d] [the narrow defini-
tion] as improper and [gave] full recognition to the broad meaning 
of the word.”184  Indeed, since the narrow definition was used perhaps 
occasionally, with the broad definition of “crime” being used more 
regularly, the use of narrow definition would have been clear only if it 
was juxtaposed in the text with a word such as “misdemeanors.”185  
Moreover, even if the word “crime” had two viable meanings and 
even if the Framers had selected the narrow definition at the Consti-
tutional Convention, the Framers did no such thing when it came to 
the Sixth Amendment.  Instead, the Sixth Amendment’s “criminal 
prosecutions” language mirrors the original “criminal offenses” lan-
guage in Article III, which the Court had seen as embodying the 
broader definition of “crime.”  Finally, the use of the word “all” in the 
Sixth Amendment predicate also undermines the notion that the 
predicate was meant to be limited to a subset of prosecutions.186 
In addition, the Court’s problematic interpretation of the predi-
cate clause in the jury trial context also stemmed from the Court’s 
misreading of the historical record.  In a series of cases long before 
the right to a jury trial was incorporated to the states, the Court had 
 
180 Id. at 69–70 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *5). 
181 Id. at 70 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 180, at *5). 
182 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury . . . .”). 
183 Schick, 195 U.S. at 70.  Such a reading of the actions at the Constitutional Convention was 
also set forth in an influential article by Felix Frankfurter and Thomas G. Corcoran a 
couple of decades later.  See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses 
and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 978–79 (1926) (citing 
Schick, 195 U.S. at 70). 
184 George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 260 (1959). 
185 Id. at 258–59. 
186 Id. at 259–60. 
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noted, often in dicta, that the common law and the practices of the 
colonies and early states showed that petty trials were often tried 
summarily and that the right to a jury trial, therefore, was not meant 
to extend to petty crimes.187  The historical record, however, does not 
support such a thesis.  While it is undoubtedly true that petty crimes 
were subject to summary trials during the common law, so were non-
petty crimes.188  Moreover, as far as the colonies go, many either had 
no constitutional right to a jury trial or had limited that right to seri-
ous crimes or even capital cases.189  Furthermore, where summary tri-
als did take place, the “power to dispense with the criminal jury had 
been reserved to the legislature . . . .”190 
Most importantly, whatever the practice of the common law, colo-
nies or early states, the concerns that led to the adoption of the Bill 
of Rights were directed narrowly at a central government, one that 
was feared might become potentially oppressive or tyrannical.  That 
is, the federal government stood on different footing and, even if 
states, which were primarily responsible for crime and safety, retained 
the power to dispense with juries for petty crimes, such power would 
not have been warranted for the federal government.  In fact, none 
of the federal crimes in existence when the Sixth Amendment was ra-
tified was petty.191 
Nor is the Court’s textually inconsistent construction of the predi-
cate clause defensible on policy grounds.  It is evident that the 
Court’s desire to limit the scope of the predicate clause in the coun-
sel and jury trial contexts was motivated by a desire to minimize the 
costs on states.192  The Court could certainly have imposed such a re-
 
187 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624–29 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 
U.S. 65, 70 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621, 624 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 
U.S. 540, 552 (1888); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (“So-called 
petty offenses were tried without juries both in England and in the Colonies . . . .”); 
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 183, at 978. 
188 Kaye, supra note 184, at 246–47. 
189 Id. at 248–57. 
190 Id. at 257. 
191 See infra Appendix A. 
192 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) (explaining that 
the Court was “weighing the advantages to the defendant against the administrative in-
convenience to the State inherent in a jury trial and magically concluding that the scale 
tips at six months’ imprisonment”); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 188–89 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(“It is a cumbersome process, not only imposing great cost in time and money on both 
the State and the jurors themselves, but also contributing to delay in the machinery of 
justice.  Untrained jurors are presumably less adept at reaching accurate conclusions of 
fact than judges, particularly if the issues are many or complex.  And it is argued by some 
that trial by jury, far from increasing public respect for law, impairs it:  the average man, it 
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striction on state prosecutions under a theory of refined incorpora-
tion—it could have expressly chosen to not incorporate the “in all 
criminal prosecutions” predicate and instead to require the rights to 
jury trial and counsel are fundamental only in subsets of criminal 
prosecutions in state courts.193  With respect to federal prosecutions, 
however, this type of “weighing” had already been done by the Fram-
ers, who “decided that the value of a jury trial far outweighed its costs 
for ‘all crimes’ and ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions.’”194 
Perhaps it was this poor textual interpretation and historical re-
cord that led Justice Black to conclude that, by reading a six month 
limitation into the jury trial right, the Court was engaging in “judicial 
mutilation of our written Constitution”195 and simply legislating “that 
‘all crimes’ did not mean ‘all crimes,’ but meant only ‘all serious 
crimes.’”196 
Since the Court’s entangled reading of the “all criminal prosecu-
tions” clause is neither textually supported nor historically faithful, 
the Court should disentangle this clause.  This would mean that all 
seven procedural rights of the Sixth Amendment, including the 
rights to jury trial and counsel, would apply to all federal prosecu-
tions.  For state prosecutions, since the predicate clause need not be 
incorporated to the states, the Court’s current limitations on the 
scope of the rights to jury trial and counsel would remain valid. 
B.  The Right to Compulsory Process 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”197  While this text speaks 
plainly to the “process” for calling witnesses to the trial, not to the 
 
is said, reacts favorably neither to the notion that matters he knows to be complex are be-
ing decided by other average men, nor to the way the jury system distorts the process of 
adjudication.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Dripps, supra note 10, at 1568–69 (“While the 
states struggled to accommodate the new rules, the Court—even with Earl Warren still 
serving as Chief Justice—began to qualify the Bill of Rights guarantees that had been 
forced on the states. . . . The Burger and Rehnquist Courts accelerated the process of re-
trenchment . . . .”); Lawrence Herman & Charles A. Thompson, Scott v. Illinois and the 
Right to Counsel:  A Decision in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 76–77 (1979) 
(arguing that the Court in Argersinger and Scott was motivated primarily by a desire not to 
financially overburden states). 
193 See Amar, supra note 171, at 1260–84 (discussing the theory of refined incorporation). 
194 Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 75 (Black, J., concurring). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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regulation of witnesses’ testimony after they come to court, the Court 
has read the right more broadly to include the defendant’s right to 
put on witnesses and the defendant’s right to testify.  As discussed be-
low, this expansive interpretation has resulted in the entangling of 
the Sixth Amendment with due process concerns, paradoxically 
opening the door to a potentially restrictive and textually inconsistent 
reading of the clause in the future. 
The entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause can be 
traced to the Court’s decision four decades ago in Washington v. 
Texas.198  In Washington, the Court was faced with a Texas statute that 
imposed a per se bar against the use of testimony by persons who par-
ticipated in the crime with the defendant.199  As indicated by Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion, the Court could have easily resolved 
this case on due process grounds because the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has traditionally been the source of constitutional constraints 
on a state’s evidentiary rules.200  Indeed, the Court noted that “the 
most basic ingredients of due process of law” include the right “to be 
heard in [one’s] defense,”201 which in turn includes “[t]he right to of-
fer the testimony of witnesses.”202  Nevertheless, after determining 
that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was applica-
ble to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,203 the Court read the 
Compulsory Process Clause expansively to include not only the right 
to the “process” for compelling the attendance of witnesses in court, 
but also the substantive right to have those witnesses testify.204  As 
 
198 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
199 Id. at 23. 
200 Id. at 24–25 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the Texas statute is unconstitutional 
because due process forbids the arbitrary exclusion of relevant and competent evidence). 
201  Id. at 18 (majority opinion). 
202 Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)). 
203 Id. at 17–18 (noting that the Court had previously found that the Sixth Amendment 
rights to counsel, speedy trial, public trial and confrontation were “so fundamental and 
essential to a fair trial that [they were] incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” and holding that the right to compulsory process “stands on no 
lesser footing”). 
204 Id. at 14–15.  As the Court has subsequently explained, it is reluctant to read new rights 
into the Due Process Clause: 
In the field of criminal law, we “have defined the category of infractions that 
violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly” based on the recognition that, 
“[b]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Proc-
ess Clause has limited operation.”  The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to 
many aspects of criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional 
guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites undue 
interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance 
that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order. . . . “[I]t has never been 
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such, the Court located the right to have witnesses testify in both the 
Due Process and Compulsory Process Clauses thereby entangling the 
Sixth Amendment.205 
The Court’s entangled reading of the Compulsory Process Clause 
contravenes the clause’s text and history.206  The Sixth Amendment’s 
text speaks narrowly of the “process” for obtaining witnesses—that is, 
the issuance of subpoenas; it says nothing about the regulation of the 
witnesses’ testimony after they come to court.  Such a restrictive read-
ing of the text is consonant with the clause’s history.  The Framers 
had soundly rejected a proposal that the compulsory process lan-
guage be expanded to include the right to a continuance if the proc-
ess had been granted but not served—the proposal mustered support 
of less than a fifth of the Framers.207  As a Framer noted, “[I]f process 
was issued, ‘the Government did all it could; the remainder must lie 
in the discretion of the court.’”208  The Washington Court addressed 
neither the limited nature of the text nor the clause’s history.  In-
stead, the Court first engaged in a lengthy, but inapposite, discussion 
of common law principles concerning restrictions on the testimony of 
defense witnesses.209  The Court then stated that “[t]he Framers of the 
Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a de-
fendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testi-
mony he had no right to use”210 and accordingly struck down the 
Texas statute.  The Court’s conclusion, however, was misguided be-
 
thought that [decisions under the Due Process Clause] establish this Court as a 
rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.” 
  Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443–44 (internal citations omitted).  As this Article 
demonstrates, however, the impulse to provide a more concrete bearing for a constitu-
tional right by locating it in the Sixth Amendment may ironically work to undermine the 
Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections. 
205 In subsequent years, the Court, citing to its decision in Washington, similarly entangled 
the Compulsory Process Clause with due process issues in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 
(1986), and Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
206 The Court’s entangled reading of the Compulsory Process Clause also was inconsistent 
with the structure of the Bill of Rights.  As the Court had noted, the most elemental no-
tions of due process included the substantive right to have defense witnesses testify.  In 
locating the same right in the Compulsory Process Clause, the Court failed to give inde-
pendent meaning to the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment. 
207 JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  PRINCIPLES, POLICIES 
AND PERSPECTIVES 1192 (3d ed. 2006). 
208 Id. (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 756 (1789)). 
209 The discussion of common law principles, while relevant to the (due process) question of 
whether it was permissible for a state to create per se rules excluding entire classes of de-
fense testimony, was not relevant to the underlying question of whether the Compulsory 
Process Clause included two rights:  the right to issue subpoenas and the right to have the 
witnesses actually testify. 
210 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967). 
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cause it ignored the role of the Due Process Clause that, as the Court 
itself had recognized, included the right to have witnesses testify.  As 
a result, the Framers did not commit a “futile act”:  while the Com-
pulsory Process Clause only gave defendants the narrow right to the 
issuance of subpoenas for the production of witnesses and docu-
ments,211 the Due Process Clause granted defendants the ability to use 
such testimonial and documentary evidence.212 
The Court’s entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause has 
also occurred in the context of a defendant’s right to testify.  In Rock 
v. Arkansas, the Court was called upon to determine the constitution-
ality of an Arkansas evidentiary rule that prohibited hypnotically re-
freshed testimony.213  The defendant was hypnotized and wanted to 
take the stand after her memory had been refreshed.214  Although re-
lying principally on the Due Process Clause to find that the total ex-
clusion of the hypnotic testimony was unconstitutional, the Court also 
held that there is a compulsory process right to testify on one’s own 
behalf.215 
Finally, the Court entangled the Compulsory Process Clause in the 
context of an accused’s right to offer a defense.  In Holmes v. South 
Carolina, the Court faulted the trial court for excluding the defen-
dant’s evidence that a third party had committed the crime.216  Since 
the right to be heard is a critical element of due process,217 the Court 
could have based its decision on the Due Process Clause.  But the 
Court did not do so.  Instead, it cited both the Due Process Clause 
and the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause.218 
The danger posed by the Court’s entanglement of the Confronta-
tion Clause is illustrated by Taylor v. Illinois.219  In Taylor, the trial court 
 
211 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33 (1807) (“[A]ny person charged with a crime in the 
courts of the United States has a right, before as well as after indictment, to the process of 
the court to compel the attendance of his witnesses.”). 
212 This is not to suggest that due process grants defendants an unlimited right to have wit-
nesses testify.  The admissibility and use of evidence are governed by state and federal 
rules of evidence, which in turn are bounded by due process considerations. 
213 483 U.S. 44, 45 (1987). 
214 Id. at 46–47. 
215 See id. at 52–53 (arguing that there is also a Fifth Amendment right to testify on one’s own 
behalf). 
216 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
217 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1967) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)). 
218 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity 
to present a complete defense.’” (citation omitted)). 
219 484 U.S. 400 (1988). 
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had excluded a defense witness’s testimony as a penalty for the de-
fense counsel’s willful violation of a state discovery rule.220  As the 
state had argued, the Court could easily have held that the exclusion 
did not violate the defendant’s compulsory process right because the 
defendant was not denied the government’s assistance in compelling 
the witness’ attendance at trial.221  Such an approach would have been 
consistent with the plain meaning of the text and the clause’s history.  
Instead, the Court adhered to its broad reading of the clause, reiter-
ating that it also gives defendants the right to present a defense.222  
The Court, however, found that the Compulsory Process Clause had 
not been violated because the right to present a defense is not abso-
lute; it must be balanced against “[t]he integrity of the adversary 
process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence 
and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and 
efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the 
truth-determining function of the trial process.”223  The Court, thus, 
incorporated a limitation into a textually unqualified right to com-
pulsory process. 
The Court’s incorporation of a limiting principle has opened the 
door to a future restrictive reading of the Confrontation Clause.  
Consistent with current jurisprudence, the Court could find that a 
trial court’s refusal to issue a subpoena does not violate the Confron-
tation Clause if, using a balancing approach, the trial court had 
deemed the potential witness to be unreliable.  That is, the same ra-
tionale that has allowed the Court to expand the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause turns out to be the means for a potential con-
traction of the clause. 
To avoid such a potential undermining of the express, unlimited 
language of the Compulsory Process Clause, the Court should disen-
tangle the Sixth Amendment and revert to a narrow reading of the 
Compulsory Process Clause, leaving the resolution of all evidentiary 
issues to the Due Process Clause.  Under such a reading, while the 
 
220 Id. at 418. 
221 This does not mean, however, that the trial court’s actions were constitutionally accept-
able.  On the contrary, a credible argument can be made that the Court should have 
overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial under a robust reading of the Due 
Process Clause:  if the evidence being offered was relevant and reliable, its exclusion 
would violate the defendant’s right to present a defense and to be heard, especially since 
there were alternate means of addressing any harm from the discovery violation, such as 
granting a continuance, and since it was possible to punish the attorney personally for the 
discovery violation instead of punishing the client. 
222 Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408–09. 
223 Id. at 414–15. 
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Compulsory Process Clause gives defendants the right to the issuance 
of subpoenas for compelling a witness’s attendance in court, once 
that witness shows up, it is the Due Process Clause that addresses 
whether the witness will be allowed to testify.  Although such disen-
tanglement would not result in a different outcome in any of the 
Court’s Compulsory Process Clause decisions (because due process 
principles would support the same resolution by the Court), it would 
safeguard against future contraction and lead to a doctrine that is 
more faithful to the text and more historically sound. 
Such a disentangled approach is reflected in the Court’s decision 
in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie where the Court was asked to decide whether 
the Compulsory Process Clause requires the state to disclose possible 
exculpatory evidence.224  The Court chose to resolve the defendant’s 
claim using due process principles “[b]ecause the applicability of the 
Sixth Amendment to this type of case is unsettled, and because our 
Fourteenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental 
fairness of trials establish a clear framework for review.”225 
C.  The Right to a Public Trial 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial.”226  Despite this 
unequivocal guarantee,227 the Court has opened the door to the pos-
sibility that a trial may be held in closed proceedings over a defen-
 
224 480 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1987). 
225 Id. at 56.  The Court added that “[a]lthough we conclude that compulsory process pro-
vides no greater protections in this area than those afforded by due process, we need not 
decide today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ 
from those of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. 
226 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Aron Goldschneider notes that “[t]he public trial clause applies 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”  See Aron Goldschneider, Choose Your 
Poison:  A Comparative Constitutional Analysis of Criminal Trial Closure v. Witness Disguise in 
the Context of Protecting Endangered Witnesses at Trial, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 25, 30 
n.22 (2004) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)).  He also adds that 
the Oliver Court argued that “without exception all courts have held that an accused is at 
the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with 
what offense he is charged.”  Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72).  Addition-
ally, Amar has argued that under the Anglo-American tradition, a trial that is not public is 
no trial at all.  See Amar, supra note 148, at 678. 
227 This is not to say that all parts of trials must be open to the public and press.  “[C]ertain 
portions of a trial, such as sidebar conferences and in-chambers conferences, may rou-
tinely be kept confidential.”  Sixth Amendment at Trial, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 
608, 614 (2006). 
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dant’s objection.228  As discussed below, this textually inconsistent, 
and entirely avoidable, result stems from an improper entanglement 
of the Sixth Amendment with due process considerations. 
The Court’s entanglement of the Public Trial Clause can be 
traced to its decision in Waller v. Georgia, where the Court was asked 
to consider whether “the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a pub-
lic trial extend[s] to a suppression hearing conducted prior to the 
presentation of evidence to the jury.”229  The answer should have been 
a simple “No.”  The Sixth Amendment’s text after all unambiguously 
states that the right to public proceedings has to be provided at “tri-
al.”  There is nothing in the text that provides for this right to public 
proceedings prior to or after a trial. 
Instead, in an opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice 
Powell, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial does extend to pre-trial proceedings.230  In doing so, the Court 
drew support from a line of First Amendment cases that recognized 
that the press and public had a qualified First Amendment right to 
attend a criminal trial, including voir dire proceedings during jury se-
lection.231  The Court then used a simple syllogism:  since the press 
and public have a qualified right to attend pretrial suppression hear-
ings under the First Amendment, and since the Sixth Amendment 
public trial right is at least as protective as the First Amendment 
rights of the press and public, therefore the Sixth Amendment public 
trial right applies to suppression hearings.232  The Court also noted 
that its holding is consistent with the purposes of the right to a public 
trial, namely that it allows the public to see that the defendant “is fair-
ly dealt with and not unjustly condemned,” that it encourages the 
“judge and prosecutor [to] carry out their duties responsibly,” and 
 
228 A corollary issue raised by the public trial guarantee is whether a trial can be held in open 
proceedings over a defendant’s objection—that is, whether defendants have unlimited 
ability to waive public trials.  While the Court has held that trials may indeed be held 
open over the defendant’s objection, this jurisprudence is not inconsistent with constitu-
tional text.  This is because the issue implicates not only a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights but also the First Amendment rights of the press and the public.  In light of com-
peting textual mandates, the Court properly held that a resolution of the issue should be 
predicated on a balancing of the two constitutional provisions.  Singer v. United States, 
380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965). 
229 467 U.S. 39, 43 (1984). 
230 Id. at 48. 
231 Id. at 44–45 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 
(1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 
(1979)). 
232 Id. at 44–46. 
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that it “encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages per-
jury.”233  Finally, the Court pointed to the similarities in benefits from 
open proceedings at suppression hearings and trials.234 
Completely absent from the Court’s reasoning was any discussion 
of the plain limiting language of the Sixth Amendment that the right 
is to a public “trial.”  This is not surprising because the text proves to 
be an insurmountable obstacle.  Since the right to a public proceed-
ing is limited to a “trial,” the only way to ground the decision in the 
text would be to argue that a “trial” includes pre-trial proceedings.  
Such a position, however, is not tenable.  In addition to the right to a 
public trial, two other Sixth Amendment rights are expressly limited 
to the context of trials—the rights to speedy trial and jury trial.  It is 
unimaginable that the Court would agree that these rights could be 
extended to pre-trial proceedings, by holding either that defendants 
are entitled to have pre-trial proceedings occur in a speedy manner 
or that pre-trial proceedings ought to be conducted before juries.  
The only alternative for the Court would have been to find some lim-
iting principle that would allow it to extend one trial-specific right to 
pre-trial proceedings while not extending the others.  There is no 
such limiting principle.  Simply put, not only is there no textual sup-
port in the Sixth Amendment for the Court’s decision, but the text of 
the Sixth Amendment actually undermines the Court’s holding. 
This is not to say that there are no constitutional bases for requir-
ing that pre-trial or post-trial proceedings be open.  There are.  These 
can be found in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  The Court, relying on practically the same grounds al-
ready laid out in its opinion, could have held that due process, rather 
than the right to a public trial, requires that suppression hearings 
and other pre-trial proceedings be conducted in the open.235  After 
all, the public trial interests identified by the Court—ensuring that 
defendants are dealt with fairly, encouraging proper conduct by 
judges and prosecutors, encouraging witnesses to come forward and 
 
233 Id. at 46 (internal citations omitted). 
234 Id. at 46–47; see also Lewis F. Weakland, Confusion in the Courthouse:  The Legacy of the Gan-
nett and Richmond Newspapers Public Right to Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 615 
(1986) (arguing that the Court employed a functional analysis without even considering 
whether pretrial suppression hearings were traditionally open). 
235 While it is true that a free-standing Fourteenth Amendment due process claim was not 
raised by the parties, the Court has in the past resolved cases on grounds not raised by the 
parties.  In any event, the Court could have asked the parties for further briefing on this 
issue had it wanted to. 
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testify truthfully236—are all consonant with fundamental due process 
interests of ensuring a fair hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.237 
This argument—that the Court erred in locating its ruling in the 
Sixth Amendment instead of the Fourteenth Amendment—is not a 
matter of mere semantics.  There is a real danger in the Court’s en-
tangling a due process issue with the Sixth Amendment.  This is be-
cause the Court has adopted the First Amendment “balancing of in-
terests” jurisprudence in holding that there are circumstances in 
which the right to public pre-trial proceedings may be overridden.238  
That is, notwithstanding the fact that the Sixth Amendment does not 
in any way qualify the right to a public trial, the Court held that pre-
trial proceedings may be closed in certain circumstances.  Now, had 
the Court limited this qualification of the right to a public hearing to 
pre-trial proceedings and kept the right to public trial unfettered, 
there would have been little issue.  But, the Court drew no such line.  
Therefore, notwithstanding the absence of any limiting language in 
the text of the Sixth Amendment, the Court’s balancing of interests 
approach allows for a closure of trials over the defendant’s objection 
as much as it allows the closure of pre-trial proceedings.239  The fear 
of this textually inconsistent construction of the Sixth Amendment is 
 
236 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. 
237 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (“The failure to accord an accused a fair 
hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process.” (internal citation omitted)); 
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic re-
quirement of due process.”). 
238 Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 (“[W]e hold that under the Sixth Amendment any closure of a sup-
pression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-
Enterprise and its predecessors.”).  In the First Amendment context, the Court has held 
that the presumption that the trial be open to the press and public may be overridden “by 
an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values 
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”  Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).  
The Court has subsequently added that there are “two complementary considerations”—
“whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general pub-
lic” and “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question.”  Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. (Press-Enterprise II), 
478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
239 See Thomas G. Stacy, The Constitution in Conflict:  Espionage Prosecutions, the Right to Present a 
Defense, and the State Secrets Privilege, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 177, 251 (1987) (“Waller implicitly 
holds that, as in the first amendment context, a prospective witness’ or juror’s privacy in-
terests may overcome a defendant’s qualified sixth amendment right to a public trial in 
certain circumstances.”).  Instead of this textually inconsistent approach, the Court 
should recognize that defendants have an absolute right to insist on a public trial and 
that the denial of this right would be a structural error, one that is not amenable to harm-
less error analysis.  See State v. Washington, 755 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) 
(“The violation of the constitutional right to a public trial is a structural error, not subject 
to harmless error analysis.”). 
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not a merely theoretical concern.  Already, state and lower federal 
courts have applied the First Amendment standard to close portions 
of trials in clear contravention of the plain language of the Sixth 
Amendment.240 
The danger stemming from the Court’s introduction of a new 
balancing of interests is accentuated by the factors that are involved 
in the balancing process.  As noted earlier, not all balancing of inter-
ests is alien to the Sixth Amendment.  For instance, when a defen-
dant seeks to waive the right to a public trial, there arises a conflict 
between two constitutional provisions—the defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment rights and the First Amendment rights of the public and the 
press to attend trials.  In such circumstances, a balancing of compet-
ing constitutional interests is unavoidable.  The Court’s decision in 
Waller, however, involves balancing of a different type.  Under the 
Waller framework, a defendant’s right to a public trial may be denied 
after balancing that constitutional right against non-constitutional in-
terests.241 
Thus, the unnecessary entanglement of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial with due process considerations has opened the 
door to a contraction of an otherwise robust procedural protection 
afforded by the Sixth Amendment.  The Court’s failure to ground the 
right to public pre-trial proceedings in the Due Process Clause led it 
 
240 See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 69–72 (2d Cir. 1997) (employing the Press-
Enterprise I standard to uphold the trial court’s closure of the trial during the testimony of 
a witness); Washington, 755 N.E.2d at 424–25 (ordering a new trial after finding that the 
trial court improperly applied the Press-Enterprise I standard to close the courtroom during 
the testimony of one witness at trial); see also Sixth Amendment at Trial, supra note 227, at 
612–14 (“Federal courts have expanded the applicability of the Press-Enterprise I test be-
yond the voir dire and trial stages. . . .  Courts have applied the Press Enterprise I [sic] test to 
closures of suppression hearings and post-trial examinations of jurors for potential mis-
conduct.  Courts have also applied the Press Enterprise I [sic] test to the sealing of docu-
ments, including those that support search warrants and plea agreements, as well as 
documents stemming from electronic surveillance.  In addition, courts have applied the 
Press Enterprise I [sic] test to the sealing of records of criminal proceedings, including post-
trial motions.” (footnotes omitted)); Goldschneider, supra note 226, at 37 (“Closure of 
criminal trials in New York is exceedingly commonplace . . . .”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Se-
cret Testimony and Public Trials in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 407, 407 (1998) (“New 
York leads the country in denying public trials.”). 
241 As the Waller Court recognized, First Amendment cases make clear “that the right to an 
open trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defen-
dant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive 
information.”  Waller, 467 U.S. at 45.  The Court has also clarified that in this balancing 
process, “the interests of those other than the accused may be implicated.  The protection 
of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny may justify 
closing certain aspects of a criminal proceeding.”  Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 n.2. 
 
Feb. 2009] DISENTANGLING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 533 
 
needlessly to locate that right in the Sixth Amendment.  While the 
Court’s concurrent adoption of First Amendment balancing of inter-
ests jurisprudence to allow for the closure of pre-trial proceedings in 
some circumstances would not have posed a problem under due 
process analysis,242 its use in the Sixth Amendment is fundamentally at 
odds with the unqualified text of the Amendment and leads to an 
undermining of a critical safeguard of liberty. 
D.  The Right to a Speedy Trial 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all defendants the right to a 
speedy trial.243  Despite the fact that this text speaks solely to the time-
liness of the trial, the Court has held that, notwithstanding the length 
or reasons for the delay, there may likely be no violation of the right 
to a speedy trial unless a defendant has been prejudiced by the de-
lay.244  As discussed below, this textually inconsistent result is a conse-
quence of an improper entanglement of the Sixth Amendment. 
Prior to entanglement, the Court held that the speedy trial right 
was meant to guard against “undue and oppressive incarceration” 
and the “anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.”245  
To protect this “impairment of liberty,” federal courts, prior to incor-
 
242 Due process considerations have traditionally involved the weighing of all interests, in-
cluding non-constitutional interests.  See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“[D]etermining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ 
under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; ‘whether respondent’s constitu-
tional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests 
against the relevant state interests.’” (footnote omitted)); Superintendent, Mass. Corr. 
Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (“The requirements of due process are 
flexible and depend on a balancing of the interests affected by the relevant government 
action.”). 
243 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
244 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).  The Court also held that another factor in-
volved in determining a speedy trial claim is whether the defendant asserted that right.  
Id.  As the Court recognized, the inclusion of this factor constitutes a departure from the 
general rule against the use of silence to infer waiver of a constitutional right.  Id.  For ex-
ample, the Court has held that the right to counsel applies regardless of the defendant’s 
request for the assistance of counsel.  See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) 
(“[T]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant . . . .”); 
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) (“[W]here the assistance of counsel is a 
constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a re-
quest.”); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“‘[C]ourts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . we 
‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’” (footnote omitted)).  
Since the use of this factor does not involve entanglement issues, a discussion of its merits 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
245 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). 
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poration, imposed a mechanical rule for speedy trial violations.246  
This rule applied irrespective of the reasons for the delay or whether 
the defendant was prejudiced.247 
However, during the early years of the Burger Court, the Court in 
Barker v. Wingo adopted a four-part balancing test and altered the fo-
cus of the speedy trial right from the protection of liberty to the pres-
ervation of reliable and accurate verdicts.248  In Barker, the Court held 
that the delay of five and one-half years between the period of arrest 
and trial did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy 
trial right.249  The Court’s remarkable250 finding that a multiple-year 
delay was speedy might be explained by two factors.  First, Barker is a 
case where “bad facts make bad law.”251  The first section of the Justice 
Powell’s majority opinion begins with a summary of the crime:  “On 
July 20, 1958, in Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was 
beaten to death by intruders wielding an iron tire tool.”252  Second, 
although suggesting that the remedy for a violation of the right to a 
speedy trial—dismissal of the indictment with prejudice253—is an “un-
satisfactorily severe remedy,” the Barker Court nevertheless accepted 
that that “it is the only possible remedy.”254  To avoid the possibility 
that a defendant convicted of a brutal murder would walk free, the 
Court had to construct a constitutional justification, which came from 
the adoption of a due process prejudice requirement.255 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell began by asserting 
that the speedy trial right is “generically different” from any other 
 
246 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 153 (discussing United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880)). 
247 Id. 
248 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–33. 
249 Id. at 536. 
250 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial:  Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
525, 538 (1975) (“To debate the question whether the sixth amendment has been vio-
lated in such egregious cases as these . . . is itself to make a feeble farce of the amend-
ment.”). 
251 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
252 Barker, 407 U.S. at 516. 
253 See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973) (holding that the dismissal of the 
indictment is the remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right). 
254 Barker, 407 U.S. at 522. 
255 Commentators have noted that the intersection of these two factors may well explain why 
the Court held that a five and one-half year period did not violate the defendant’s right to 
a speedy trial.  Thomas, supra note 1, at 227–28 (“Apparently recognizing the difficulty in 
classifying as ‘speedy’ a trial that occurs five and one-half years after Barker was arrested, 
the unanimous Court spoke mostly in terms of whether the delay caused doubt about the 
accuracy of the outcome, about whether the defendant’s case was prejudiced by the de-
lay.”). 
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constitutional right.256  The uniqueness of the right, according to Jus-
tice Powell, lies in its vagueness, amorphous nature, remedy, and the 
fact that the public benefits from the right adversely to the defen-
dant.257  The Sixth Amendment, however, “contains a number of 
items which the defendant might willingly forego and upon which 
the state might insist.”258  The truer sense of the uniqueness to which 
Justice Powell refers is the remedy, which he finds “unsatisfactory 
when viewed in the light of the ‘amorphous quality of the right.’”259 
Prior to setting out the standard for a speedy trial violation, Justice 
Powell rejected two “rigid” attempts made by lower courts to provide 
certainty to the otherwise “slippery” right.260  The first suggested ap-
proach would require the Court to adopt a mechanical time limit, 
which Justice Powell rejected out of hand, as it would require the 
Court to “engage in legislative or rulemaking activity.”261  The second 
suggested approach was the “demand-waiver doctrine,” which would 
require waiver unless the defendant demands a speedy trial.262  Justice 
Powell also rejected this suggestion as inconsistent with the Court’s 
holdings that waiver of a constitutional right may not be waived with-
out consent.263  Although rejecting these two approaches, the Court 
nonetheless incorporated each in its four-part balancing standard.264 
Under the adopted Barker standard, the consideration of a viola-
tion is “trigger[ed]” by a lengthy delay considered “presumptively 
prejudicial” lengthy delay.265  Whether the length of delay is presump-
tively prejudicial will, according to the Court, vary depending on the 
“peculiar circumstances of the case.”266  If the length triggers this pre-
sumption, a court must then consider the reason for the delay.267  
Next, a court must consider whether the defendant asserts the right, 
because, as Justice Powell argues, the more that a defendant is preju-
diced by the delay, the more likely she will make a demand for a 
 
256 Barker, 407 U.S. at 519. 
257 Id. at 519–22. 
258 H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo:  Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 
1376, 1379 (1972) (calling into question the asserted uniqueness of the speedy trial 
right). 
259 Id. at 1381. 
260 Barker, 407 U.S. at 522. 
261 Id. at 523. 
262 Id. at 525. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 530. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 530–31. 
267 Id. at 531. 
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speedy trial.268  Finally, a court should consider whether the delay pre-
judiced the defense.269 
The adoption of the prejudice requirement signaled a radical shift 
in the Court’s speedy trial jurisprudence.  As noted above, prior to 
Barker the Court had held that the purpose of the speedy trial right is 
to protect a defendant’s liberty interests.270  Although Justice Powell 
acknowledges this purpose, he nevertheless claims that “the most se-
rious” interest is to “limit the possibility that the defense will be im-
paired,” which if not protected, “skews the fairness of the entire sys-
tem” and affects the outcome.271  Prejudice, however, is “a rationale 
that has as its goal accuracy rather than simply the provision of the 
‘speedy trial’ the Sixth Amendment guarantees.”272  By relying on “ac-
curacy” and “prejudice,” therefore, the Court entangled the Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial right with traditional due process concerns. 
A more faithful interpretation of the speedy trial right would re-
quire eliminating Barker’s prejudice requirement.273  Such an ap-
proach is suggested by Justice Souter’s majority and Justice Thomas’s 
dissenting opinions in Doggett v. United States.274  In Doggett, the Court 
found that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was 
violated when, unbeknownst to the defendant, more than eight years 
lapsed between the time of his indictment and the time of his ar-
rest.275  Writing for the majority, Justice Souter relied on both the 
 
268 Id. at 531–32. 
269 Id. at 532. 
270 See supra text accompanying note 245. 
271 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. 
272 Thomas, supra note 1, at 163. 
273 Professor Thomas has a similar thesis in which he calls for disentangling the Sixth 
Amendment criminal procedure guarantees from the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 231.  
However, Professor Thomas argues that this disentanglement should only occur at fed-
eral trials, as opposed to state trials, which he argues should be decided solely under the 
Due Process Clause.  Id. at 232.  In other words, Professor Thomas proposes that the same 
procedural rights have different meanings in federal courts and in state courts.  This Arti-
cle suggests instead that each of the Sixth Amendment’s seven procedural provisions 
means the same thing in any context.  The Article, does, however, suggest that the predi-
cate clause preceding the seven procedural protections in the Sixth Amendment, which 
speaks only to the scope of the rights not to their substantive meaning, need not have 
been incorporated along with the procedural right.  So, for example, it would have been 
proper for the Court to hold that the right to counsel applies to all federal prosecutions 
as the text of the Sixth Amendment demands, but only applies to state prosecutions for 
felonies and those misdemeanors that result in the imposition of a term of imprisonment 
because, under due process, the right to counsel is only critical to fundamental fairness in 
these state court proceedings. 
274 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). 
275 Id. at 649–50. 
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length between indictment and arrest and the government’s negli-
gence in prosecuting the defendant.276  Although the defendant was 
unable to show specific prejudice from the delay, the Court made its 
holding consistent with Barker by “invent[ing] a presumptive preju-
dice arising from a delay of that length,”277 which, Justice Souter ar-
gued, “compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party 
can prove or, for that matter, identify.”278  Justice Thomas, joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in dissent, however, pro-
posed a more fundamental shift in the Court’s speedy trial jurispru-
dence.  They argued that the prejudice requirement, which is more 
properly the concern of the Due Process Clause,279 should be elimi-
nated and that the protection of liberty be restored as the principal 
protection of the speedy trial.280 
Under a disentangled reading of the Speedy Trial Clause, there-
fore, a violation would rest on the showing that the state failed to 
prosecute the accused281 in a speedy fashion and the reason for the 
delay was not prompted by the defendant’s request.282  Once a defen-
dant makes this showing, the burden should shift to the prosecution 
to show that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Such a test would have the virtue of comporting with other Sixth 
Amendment rights and mitigating the seemingly unjustifiable remedy 
of dismissing an indictment with prejudice.  Moreover, by removing 
the prejudice requirement, the Court could restore the plain mean-
ing of the right to a speedy trial and disentangle the speedy trial right 
from the Due Process Clause, which would apply solely to preaccusa-
tion delays.283 
 
276 Id. at 657–58. 
277 Thomas, supra note 1, at 229; see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (“Thus, we generally have to 
recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways 
that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.”). 
278 Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. 
279 See id. at 666 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
280 See id. at 660–61.  Ultimately, Justice Thomas would have denied relief because the defen-
dant suffered no harm to his liberty interest.  Id. at 666 n.4. 
281 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (holding that the right attaches 
when “the putative defendant in some way becomes an ‘accused’”); see also Doggett, 505 
U.S. at 662 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the prejudice standard should govern 
the period between crime and trial). 
282 The use of the word speedy indicates that the length of time should vary with the factors 
involved in individual prosecutions, rather than establishing a one size fits all approach to 
every type of prosecution.  Professor Thomas makes a similar argument; however, he 
would rest a violation solely on a showing of delay, “within six months or so.”  Thomas, 
supra note 1, at 228. 
283 See Amsterdam, supra note 250, at 528. 
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E.  The Right to Confrontation 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”284  This Confrontation Clause has been under-
stood to involve at its core four procedural safeguards, including the 
right to a face-to-face confrontation.285  The Court, however, has held 
that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and that 
public policy considerations may supersede the constitutional right in 
some circumstances.286  As discussed below, this elevation of public 
policy over the plain text of the Sixth Amendment has been the result 
of an entanglement of the Confrontation Clause with due process 
concerns of reliability of the verdict.287 
The groundwork for the Court’s entanglement of this aspect of 
the Confrontation Clause was laid in the Court’s decision in Coy v. 
Iowa.288  In Coy, the Court considered a statute that permitted a court 
to place a screen between the victim of sexual abuse and the defen-
dant that, once adjustments to the lighting were made, allowed the 
defendant to see the witness but the witness not to see the defen-
dant.289  Arguing that the “irreducible literal meaning of the Clause” 
is to ensure face-to-face confrontation, the Court held that the use of 
the screen violated the Confrontation Clause.290  While Justice 
O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion recognizing exceptions to this 
rule,291 the majority opinion by Justice Scalia noted that “[w]e leave 
for another day, however, the question whether any exceptions ex-
ist.”292 
Two years later, in Maryland v. Craig, the Court directly addressed 
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause’s requirement of face-to-face 
 
284 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
285 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990). 
286 See id. at 849–50. 
287 See Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 539 (2003) 
(“[T]he Court’s present interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is inconsistent, un-
disciplined, and result-oriented.  That indictment is largely due to the Court’s decisions 
which ultimately replaced a fundamental constitutional right with a rule of evidence.  
This approach resulted in the virtual elimination of a crucial constitutional guarantee.”). 
288 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
289 Id. at 1014–15. 
290 Id. at 1021. 
291 See id. at 1022 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that Confrontation rights are not ab-
solute but “rather may give way in an appropriate case to other competing interests so as 
to permit the use of certain procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from 
the trauma of courtroom testimony”). 
292 Id. at 1021 (majority opinion). 
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confrontation.293  In Craig, the Court was asked to decide the constitu-
tionality of a Maryland statute that permitted the trial judge, after 
finding that the witness would be traumatized by testifying in open 
court, to allow that witness, a victim of child abuse, to testify in a sep-
arate room.294  In addition, although the defendant was excluded 
from that room, attorneys from both sides were permitted to question 
the witness and the witness’ testimony was televised to the courtroom 
through a one-way closed circuit television.295  Writing for the major-
ity, Justice O’Connor held that the Maryland statute did not violate 
the Confrontation Clause.296  Justice O’Connor stated that the Con-
frontation Clause expresses only a “preference”297 for face-to-face con-
frontation and that the underlying purpose of such an encounter and 
of the other three elements of the Confrontation Clause (oath taking, 
cross-examination, and jury observance of witness demeanor) is to 
ensure reliability of the evidence admitted against the accused.298  Jus-
tice O’Connor concluded that if the trial is reliable, then a strict re-
quirement of all of these elements would needlessly impede impor-
tant public policies. 
The Court’s opinion in Craig, which used public policy considera-
tions to limit the scope of an otherwise textually and historically un-
bounded constitutional provision, has been the subject of consider-
able criticism.  Justice Scalia issued one of his more scathing dissents 
in Craig.  He attacked the majority’s analysis, which he argued “ab-
stracts from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the 
right.”299 Commentators have argued that Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
in Craig undermines the presumption of innocence;300 misses the for-
est for the trees by improperly balancing the costs of wrongful convic-
 
293 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
294 Id. at 840–43. 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 860. 
297 Id. at 849 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)). 
298 Id. at 846. 
299 Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Thomas, supra note 1, at 226 (arguing that the 
Court’s tortured opinion “read the requirement of confrontation to be coextensive with 
its rationale—to permit the defendant to challenge the testimony of prosecution wit-
nesses”). 
300 See generally Ralph H. Kohlmann, The Presumption of Innocence:  Patching the Tattered Cloak 
After Maryland v. Craig, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 389 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
creation of an exception to the right to face-to-face confrontation in Craig has under-
mined the presumption of innocence which is a key element of the due process right to a 
fair trial). 
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tion against the benefits of eliminating face-to-face confrontation;301 
and fails to narrowly tailor the exception to important state inter-
ests.302 
More importantly, however, the Court’s analysis has led to the en-
tanglement of the Sixth Amendment.  As Justice Scalia pointed out in 
his dissenting opinion, “the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee 
reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were 
thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was 
‘face-to-face’ confrontation.”303  Reliability, on the other hand, is 
quintessentially a due process concern.304 
Disentangling the Confrontation Clause by reverting to the bright-
line requirement of face-to-face confrontation would restore the 
plain meaning and full protection of the Confrontation Clause.305  
 
301 See generally Peter T. Wendel, A Law and Economics Analysis of the Right to Face-to-Face Con-
frontation Post-Maryland v. Craig:  Distinguishing the Forest from the Trees, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
405, 489 (1993) (“While the Court’s holding in Maryland v. Craig may be defensible from 
a macro level point of view, the Court’s opinion attempts to rationalize the holding solely 
from a micro level point of view.  From a law and economics perspective, the outcome is a 
highly questionable result-oriented opinion which provides little guidance as to what is 
left of the right to face-to-face confrontation.”). 
302 See generally Brian L. Schwalb, Note, Child Abuse Trials and the Confrontation of Traumatized 
Witnesses:  Defining “Confrontation” to Protect Both Children and Defendants, 26 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 185 (1991) (evaluating the strength of competing views of confrontation 
enunciated in Craig and Coy in light of the underlying purposes of the Sixth Amend-
ment). 
303 Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Thomas, supra note 1, at 226 (arguing 
that the Court’s tortured opinion “read the requirement of confrontation to be coexten-
sive with its rationale—to permit the defendant to challenge the testimony of prosecution 
witnesses”). 
304 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363–64 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[R]eliability is 
more properly a due process concern.”); see Thomas, supra note 1, at 226 (arguing that 
while the Court’s analysis would have been acceptable if it was deciding a due process 
claim, it is problematic in the context of a Confrontation Clause claim because the Sixth 
Amendment “does not talk about due process, or fairness, or reliable outcomes.  It talks 
about confrontation”). 
305 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 227.  Professor Thomas argues that such disentanglement 
need only happen with respect to federal prosecutions; state prosecutions could continue 
to be governed by the Craig rule because state actions are limited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.  
This Article proposes an alternate approach.  While it adheres to the traditional approach 
that those provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated have identical 
meanings under the Fourteenth Amendment, it recognizes that the Sixth Amendment’s 
“in all criminal prosecutions” predicate is not a substantive protection, but only one that 
goes to the scope of cases in which the procedural protections apply.  As such, since the 
concerns about a potentially oppressive or tyrannical government were directed more at 
the federal government than the states, it is entirely proper that when the provisions of 
the Sixth Amendment are made applicable to the states, the Court may circumscribe the 
universe of cases to which the provisions will apply.  In particular, the rights to a jury trial 
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The prospect for such disentanglement appears more likely given the 
Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington where Justice Tho-
mas wrote, while “the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to en-
sure reliability of evidence, . . . it is a procedural rather than a sub-
stantive guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but 
that reliability be assessed in a particular manner . . . .”306  This princi-
ple is equally applicable to the Court’s decision in Craig. 
F.  The Right to Assistance of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment provides that all defendants have the right 
to assistance of counsel307 and this right to counsel has been recog-
nized as being “the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”308  
This is because an ineffective counsel is “not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”309  
Prior to the incorporation of the right to counsel, the Court had used 
the Fourteenth Amendment to require that, in cases where due proc-
ess required the appointment of counsel, counsel provide effective 
assistance.310  Since the Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, the denial of effective assistance has been recognized as a vio-
lation of the Sixth Amendment.311  As discussed below, however, the 
Court has entangled this right to effective assistance by requiring that 
defendants demonstrate—not for purposes of determining whether 
relief is warranted once a violation is proved, but for purposes of de-
termining whether the constitutional provision in fact has been vio-
lated—that the attorney’s performance affected the reliability of the 
verdict. 
 
and counsel should apply without exception in all federal cases, but properly can be re-
quired only in a subset of prosecutions in state courts. 
306 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
307 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
308 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
309 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
310 See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (“The effective assistance of counsel in such a 
case is a constitutional requirement of due process which no member of the Union may 
disregard.”); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (noting that “the denial of op-
portunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused and to prepare his 
defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (holding that due process was violated not only by the failure to give 
defendants an adequate opportunity to retain counsel, but by the appointment of counsel 
in such a manner as to preclude effective assistance).  The same right appears to have 
been provided in federal court prosecutions by the Sixth Amendment.  See Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1942). 
311 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146–47 (2006); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
686; McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14. 
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During the last years of the Burger Court, the Supreme Court 
elaborated on the elements of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel in Strickland v. Washington, establishing a two-pronged stan-
dard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  The first prong re-
quires the defendant to “show that counsel’s performance was defi-
cient,” and  provides that counsel’s performance be evaluated using 
“prevailing professional norms,” that there should be a “strong pre-
sumption” of counsel’s reasonableness, and that, in reviewing strate-
gic decisions, courts should apply a “heavy measure of deference to 
counsel’s judgments.”312  While much criticism has been directed as 
this prong of the Strickland test,313 it is not the focus of this Article be-
cause it does not involve any issue of entanglement. 
Rather, it is the second prong of the Strickland standard that is the 
source of the entanglement of the right to counsel.  This prong re-
quires the defendant to show that counsel’s deficiency was prejudicial 
to the defense.314  While prejudice may be presumed in some limited 
cases, as a general matter the defendant must “affirmatively prove 
prejudice,”315 which requires the defendant to demonstrate that 
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.”316 
Strickland’s prejudice prong is problematic for purposes of this Ar-
ticle because it entangles the Sixth Amendment with traditional due 
process concerns.  Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor stated 
that since “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is 
needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial,”317 to 
satisfy the prejudice prong the defendant must show “counsel’s errors 
 
312 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–91. 
313 See Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel:  Old Roads, New Paths—A  Dead 
End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 82 (1986) (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s concerns about 
handcuffing defense counsel are unpersuasive and “[a]ppropriately rigorous professional 
standards for appraising counsel’s conduct should not discourage the type of attorney 
one wants to attract from accepting in forma pauperis assignments”); Meredith J. Dun-
can, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys:  A System in Need of Reform, 2002 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (arguing that it has weakened criminal defense lawyering and that Strick-
land’s presumption’s are too burdensome). 
314 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.  (“Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must 
be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Con-
stitution.”) 
315 Id. at 693.  
316 Id. at 694.  “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.”  Id. 
317 Id. at 684. 
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were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”318  This rea-
soning led to the entanglement of the Sixth Amendment not only 
because the right to a fair trial has been seen as a distinctly due proc-
ess right,319 but also because, rather than understanding a fair trial as 
being one in which the procedures used were fair, Justice O’Connor 
defined a fair trial as “a trial whose result is reliable.”320  Therefore, to 
establish a Sixth Amendment claim, the Court required defendants 
to demonstrate the unreliability of the verdict or sentence,321 a quin-
tessentially due process consideration.322 
This entanglement has led to a textually challenged and histori-
cally unsound construction of the right to counsel.  While the text of 
the Sixth Amendment provides that the assistance of counsel be pro-
vided to defendants “in all criminal prosecutions,” the second prong 
effectively means that the assistance of counsel need only be provided 
in those prosecutions where there is a reasonable probability that de-
fendants will receive a favorable verdict at guilt or sentencing. 
In addition, the Court’s entangled approach has reduced the pre-
scriptive value of the right to counsel.  Whatever might be said of the 
Court’s approach in Strickland from an ex post perspective, the ap-
proach is deeply problematic from an ex ante perspective.  By failing 
to require an ex ante inquiry into whether “the defense is institution-
ally equipped to litigate as effectively as the prosecution”323 and by al-
 
318 Id. at 687. 
319 See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (considering “the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution”); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (stating that “[a] fair trial is a 
basic requirement of due process”); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563–64 (1967) (ob-
serving that “[c]ases in this Court have long proceeded on the premise that the Due 
Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial”); 
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (noting that “the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and 
fundamental ideas of fairness and right”). 
320 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
321 See Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel:  Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 
1259, 1266 (1986) (noting that the Court  elevated the “correct” result above the proce-
dural means by which that result was achieved). 
322 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363–64 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Reliability is 
more properly a due process concern.”); William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin 
Horn:  Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
91, 145–47 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s approach has deincorporated the right to 
counsel, making it in essence solely a creature of the Due Process Clause); Thomas, supra 
note 1, at 226 (“The Sixth Amendment does not talk about due process, or fairness, or re-
liable outcomes.”). 
323 See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:  The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Stan-
dard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997).  See generally Bruce A. Green, Lethal 
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lowing reviewing courts to avoid assessing counsel’s competence by 
considering prejudice before performance,324 the Court has mini-
mized the guidance provided by the right to counsel jurisprudence to 
members of the bar.325 
Moreover, limiting the right to counsel to those defendants who 
might be innocent is inconsistent with the fact the “Framers of the 
Bill of Rights intended them to be formidable barriers to the success-
ful federal prosecution of criminal defendants, whether guilty or in-
nocent.”326 
It is not surprising then that the Court’s approach has been 
roundly criticized for permitting horrendous lawyering;327 for making 
it difficult for defendants to prove violations in those cases where 
counsel failed miserably;328 for being too forgiving of failures to inves-
tigate or present mitigating evidence;329 and for producing arbitrary 
 
Fiction:  The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 433 (1993) 
(arguing for a narrower construction of “counsel” which would “include only those attor-
neys who are qualified to render legal assistance to a person accused of a crime”). 
324 See Dripps, supra note 323, at 243; Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle:  To-
wards a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 413, 458 (1998) (providing statistics on circuit court findings of prejudice and bad 
performance under the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel analysis); see also WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.10(d) (2d ed. 1999) (“The Strickland Court 
also noted that the question of the adequacy of counsel’s performance need not be con-
sidered before examining the issue of prejudice, and lower courts clearly have been in-
fluenced by that suggestion.”). 
325 See Duncan, supra note 313, at 6; id. at 20 (“Encouraging the disposition of ineffectiveness 
claims without a discussion of deficient performance provides a disservice to legal profes-
sionalism.”). 
326 Thomas, supra note 1, at 152. 
327 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:  The Death Seuteuce Not for the Worst Crime but 
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (arguing that “[p]oor people accused 
of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the skills, resources, and com-
mitment to handle such serious matters”); Geimer, supra note 321, at 148 (asserting that 
“many instances of dreadful lawyering are found to be acceptable” under Strickland); Ed-
ward M. Kennedy, The Promise of Equal Justice, THE CHAMPION 22 (Jan./Feb. 2003), avail-
able at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/championarticles/A0301p22?OpenDocument 
(arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to assure defendants a meaningful right to as-
sistance of counsel and discussing cases including that of Wallace Fugate, who was exe-
cuted in Georgia). 
328 See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. 
REV. 1433, 1467 (1999) (asserting that the record and transcript may not reflect what 
counsel ought to have done, and that there may be no remedy for the “clearly guilty” de-
fendant). 
329 See generally Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just:  The Rationing and Denial of Legal Ser-
vices to the Poor When Life And Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 792  (discuss-
ing an American Bar Association study that found Tennessee attorneys had failed to offer 
mitigating evidence “in approximately one-quarter of all the death sentences affirmed by 
the Tennessee Supreme Court since the Tennessee legislature promulgated its current 
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reviews in capital cases;330 for putting reviewing courts in the difficult 
position of having to determine from a cold record whether an out-
come during the penalty phase would have been different;331 for cre-
ating an framework that allows reviewing courts to conflate the trial 
and sentencing phases under the prejudice analysis;332 for creating 
“an almost insurmountable hurdle for defendants claiming ineffec-
tive assistance”;333 and for overemphasizing factual innocence.334 
The prospect for disentangling the right to counsel are bright335 in 
light of the Court’s recent decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, a 
case in which the Court was asked to “decide whether a trial court’s 
erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant’s choice of counsel 
entitles him to a reversal of his conviction.”336  In response to the gov-
ernment’s claim that the defendant should be required to show that 
 
death penalty statute”); Carter Center Symposium on the Death Penalty, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
329, 379 (1998) (discussing a National Law Journal study of capital cases in six Southern 
states that found that “capital trials often were completed in one to two days [and the] 
penalty phase, a capital trial’s most important part, usually started immediately after a 
guilty verdict and lasted only several hours and, in at least one case, just fifteen minutes”); 
Stephen Henderson, Defense Often Inadequate in 4 Death-Penalty States, MCCLATCHY, Jan. 23, 
2007, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/201/story/15394.html (reviewing 80 
death sentences issued in Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and Virginia between 1997 and 
2004 and finding that “[i]n 73 of the 80 cases, defense lawyers gave jurors little or no evi-
dence to help them decide whether the accused should live or die.  The lawyers routinely 
missed myriad issues of abuse and mental deficiency, abject poverty and serious psycho-
logical problems”). 
330 See Amy R. Murphy, Note, The Constitutional Failure of the Strickland Standard in Capital 
Cases Under the Eighth Amendment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 179 (2000) (arguing 
that the broad discretion for review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims sanctioned 
by the Strickland Court “leads to arbitrary determination in capital cases”). 
331 See Jeffery Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie:  Raising the Standard for Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 169 (2001) (pointing out that the outcome 
of the penalty phase “will turn on substantive facts” which are difficult to determine for 
an appellate judge who is “removed from the context of the decision”). 
332 See id. at 170 (illustrating “the undifferentiated application of the prejudice prong to 
both” the “guilt/innocence phase” and the “sentencing phase,” and the resulting confla-
tion of those phases). 
333 See Calhoun, supra note 324, at 427. 
334 See Duncan, supra note 313, at 19 (“[A]s a result of Strickland, an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is essentially rendered a viable claim available only to the truly innocent 
criminal defendant.”).  But see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986) (declin-
ing “to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to 
the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual 
guilt”). 
335 See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 207–08 (2006) 
[hereinafter 2005 Term] (arguing that “incongruity between the counsel of choice doc-
trine [in Gonzalez-Lopez] and the effective assistance of counsel doctrine as established in 
Strickland” should be resolved by eliminating the prejudice prong from Strickland). 
336 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 142 (2006). 
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the substituted counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e. 
that the defendant did not receive a fair trial, Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, answered that the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel of choice, “commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular 
guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be de-
fended by the counsel he believes to be best.”337  Justice Scalia further 
argued for disentanglement by claiming that “the right at stake here 
is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that 
right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was errone-
ous.”338 
In his Gonzalez-Lopez opinion, Justice Scalia also criticizes the 
Court’s earlier method of outlining the limits of certain Sixth 
Amendment rights from their purpose to provide a fair trial.339  As ex-
amples, Justice Scalia cites Ohio v. Roberts, in which the Court rea-
soned that the Confrontation Clause was not violated as long as the 
purpose of ensuring reliability was satisfied,340 and Maryland v. Craig, 
in which the Court “abstract[ed] from the right to its purposes, and 
then eliminate[d] the right.”341  Justice Scalia concedes that “the pur-
pose of the rights set forth in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a 
fair trial.”342  However, he concludes that “it does not follow that the 
rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.”343  
Instead, the Sixth Amendment rights have independent meaning and 
significance distinct from their purpose—the right to a fair trial.344 
In the ineffective assistance context, disentanglement would mean 
that prejudice should be eliminated from the showing necessary to 
establish a violation of the right to counsel.345  Instead, a showing of 
ineffective assistance of counsel should rest solely on demonstrating 
 
337 Id. at 146. 
338 Id. 
339 Curiously, Justice Scalia noticed the tension between the Court’s ruling in Gonzalez-Lopez 
and its holding in Strickland, but dismissed the problem by focusing on the fair trial pur-
pose of the right to effective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 146–48. 
340 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980) (describing the “indicia of reliability” requirement which the 
Court has formulated), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
341 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
342 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 145. 
343 Id. 
344 See id. at 146 (“The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, 
but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the 
Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause.” (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984)). 
345 See 2005 Term, supra note 335, at 210 (“Eliminating the prejudice prong from the Strick-
land test would thus bring the right to effective assistance of counsel more in line concep-
tually with the other Sixth Amendment rights.”). 
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that the counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.346  Once 
the defendant has made such a showing, the court should then ad-
dress the issue of whether relief should be granted using its tradi-
tional approach to these issues.  That is, the court should apply the 
harmless error rule set forth in Chapman v. California.347  It bears em-
phasizing here that although the Chapman rule normally applies only 
on direct appeal, it should apply to all initial claims of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, irrespective of the procedural posture of the 
case.348  This is because courts have not only held that defendants may 
properly bring an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on col-
lateral attack,349 but in fact have required that such claims not be 
raised until collateral proceedings.350  Once the Chapman standard has 
been applied at the first collateral review, whether in state post-
conviction or in federal habeas corpus proceedings, then courts 
could use the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson.351 
Using this approach will not only result in a textually sound and 
historically grounded disentangled reading of the right to counsel, 
but it would also lead to a proper realigning of the burdens of proof.  
While the Strickland approach places the burden on the defendant for 
establishing that the counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, 
under the harmless error approach, the burden would be on the gov-
ernment.352  Such an approach would be consistent with the Court’s 
 
346 See Gabriel, supra note 321 at 1284 (suggesting that “once a defendant meets the burden 
of proof with respect to counsel’s actions, the defendant need not prove more”); Geimer, 
supra note 322, at 139 (arguing that “a presumption of relief should arise” if the claimant 
did not receive “that which the Constitution promises”). 
347 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring the government to prove that constitutional errors were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
348 See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that “[i]f a 
defendant shows a substantial violation of any of these requirements” of effective counsel, 
the burden shifts to the government to establish a lack of prejudice). 
349 Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (finding that the objectives of the 
“general rule that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral re-
view” are not promoted by requiring a defendant to raise ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims on direct appeal and that “[t]he better-reasoned approach is to permit ineffective-
assistance claims to be brought in the first instance in a timely motion in the district court 
under § 2255”). 
350 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 450 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2006) (“In general, an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim is not cognizable on direct appeal.”). 
351 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (holding that on federal habeas corpus of constitutional errors, 
the standard is whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in de-
termining the jury’s verdict” (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 
(1946)). 
352 See 2005 Term, supra note 335, at 212 (indicating that harmless error review “would shift 
the heavy burden of showing no prejudice onto the government”). 
 
548 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
general approach to other non-structural constitutional errors,353 in-
cluding non-structural violations of the right to counsel in other con-
texts.354 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment, framed amidst deep misgivings about a 
potentially oppressive central government, mandates that the federal 
government provide all defendants seven fundamental procedural 
protections.  Over the course of the past few decades, the Supreme 
Court’s expansive and restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment 
have led to constructions that are inconsistent with the Amendment’s 
text.  These problematic readings, caused by entanglements of the 
Sixth Amendment with the Due Process Clause, have led to dimin-
ished procedural protections against infringement of individual lib-
erty. 
The Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence bears signs of 
the Court’s willingness to disentangle the Sixth Amendment and re-
turn to a textually grounded reading of the Amendment.  Were the 
Court to continue this project and disentangle the various entangle-
ments identified in this Article, it would do much to restore the Sixth 
Amendment’s robust role in protecting individual liberty as envi-
sioned when it was adopted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
353 See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (holding that Confrontation 
Clause errors, including the improper denial of defendant’s opportunity to impeach a 
witness for bias, are subject to harmless-error analysis); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 
691 (1986) (holding the harmless error rule applies to the unconstitutional restriction on 
a defendant’s right not to testify). 
354 See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988) (holding that the harmless error rule 
applies to the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the right to counsel); 
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (holding the Chapman harmless error rule ap-
plies to violation of the right to counsel at pretrial corporeal identification); Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (holding the Chapman harmless error rule applies for de-
nial of counsel at preliminary hearing); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (apply-
ing the harmless error test to the admission of a constitutionally infirm prior criminal 
conviction). 
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APPENDIX A:  FEDERAL CRIMES AT THE TIME THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
WAS RATIFIED355 
Crime 
1790 
Punishment 
Current 
Punishment 
Current Code 
Treason Death Death; 5 years, 
$10,000 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 2381 
Murder Death First degree:  
Death or life; 
Second de-
gree:  Term or 
life  
18 U.S.C. 
§ 1111 
Piracy and felony Death Life 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1651 
Accessories to pi-
racy before the 
fact 
Death n/a n/a 
Forgery and 
counterfeiting 
Death 20 years  18 U.S.C. 
§ 471 
Rescue of a per-
son convicted of 
a capital crime 
Death 25 years, fine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 753 
Misprision of 
treason 
7 years, $1,000 7 years, fine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2382 
Misprision of 
murder or felony 
3 years, $500 3 years, fine 18 U.S.C. § 4 
Manslaughter 3 years, $1,000 Voluntary: 10 
years, fine; In-
voluntary: 6 
years, fine 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 1112 
Accessories to pi-
racy after the fact 
3 years, $500 n/a n/a 
Confederacy to 
become pirates 
3 years, $1,000 3 years, fine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1657 
 
355 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 
(1790). 
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Crime 
1790 
Punishment 
Current 
Punishment 
Current Code 
Maiming on 
Unites States’ 
property or on 
the high seas 
7 years, $1,000 20 years, fine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 114 
Stealing or falsi-
fying a record or 
process 
7 years, 
$5,000, 39 
stripes 
5 years, fine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1506 
Perjury 3 years, $800, 
1 hour in the 
pillory 
5 years, fine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1621 
Obstruction of 
process 
1 year, $300 1 year, fine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1509 
Rescue of a per-
son before trial 
1 year, $500 5 years, fine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 752 
Suing an ambas-
sador or foreign 
minister 
3 years, fine at 
court’s discre-
tion 
n/a n/a 
Violation of safe 
conduct, or vio-
lence to ambas-
sador or minister 
3 years, fine at 
court’s discre-
tion 
3 years, fine 18 U.S.C. 
§ 112 
Larceny on 
United States’ 
property or on 
the high seas 
4 times the 
value of 
goods, 39 
stripes 
5 years if more 
than $1,000; 1 
year if $1,000 
or less 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 661 
Receiving stolen 
goods 
4 times the 
value of 
goods, 39 
stripes  
3 years if more 
than $1,000; 1 
year if $1,000 
or less 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 662 
Bribery of a 
judge 
Fine and im-
prisonment at 
the discretion 
of the judge 
1 year if not 
willful; 5 years 
if willful 
18 U.S.C. 
§§ 203, 216 
 
 
 
 
 
